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ABSTRACT  
 
 
Dolus eventualis has correctly been described as an ‘enigma’. Not only has it been variously 
described by the courts, but they have applied the two-stage test, the cognitive and conative 
component, without providing an in-depth analysis of it means. Both dolus eventualis required 
for murder and conscious negligence required for culpable homicide contain an element of 
subjective foresight of the remote possibility of death occurring. As a result, the distinction 
between murder and culpable has become confused over the years, evident in the courts 
vacillating between findings of murder and culpable homicide. Regarding the cognitive 
component, the lack of clarity lies in the degree of foresight which is required, and with regard 
to the conative component, not only has it been variously described, but it is labelled ‘an 
unnecessary appendage’. Considering this lack of clarity, there exists a need to examine the 
test for dolus eventualis in the case of murder and to determine whether it can be distinguished 
from culpa, in the case of culpable homicide. German law is faced with the same lack of clarity 
when trying to demarcate bedingter Vorsatz from bewuste Fahrlassigkeit, the equivalent of 
South African dolus eventualis and conscious negligence respectively. American law is also 
faced with difficulties when trying to distinguish cases of manslaughter, the South African 
equivalent of culpable homicide, from ‘extreme indifference’ murder which occurs under 
substantially the same circumstances as dolus eventualis. Therefore, South African, German 
and American law and academic opinion is consulted to establish how the respective countries 
have dealt with the conflation of murder and negligent killings. This has been done by 
conducting desktop-based (digital and manual) research. From the findings of the research, the 
current test for dolus eventualis cannot properly be distinguished from cases of culpable 
homicide and should be reformulated to include foresight of a real, reasonable or substantial 
possibility of death ensuing. This creates a higher standard of proof which is appropriate for 
the seriousness of the crime of murder and allows for the contentious conative component to 
be dispensed with. However, if death was not foreseen as probable, it needs to be asked whether 
the accused’s conduct offends the legal system to cover those situations in which the accused’s 
conduct has no social utility and displays an extreme indifference to the value of human life. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND  
 
MacKinnon1  correctly points out that the meaning of murder is not self-evident, and that ‘both 
its definition and status relative to other forms of homicide present serious difficulties in 
criminal law theory.’ Murder is defined as the intentional unlawful killing of a person whilst 
culpable homicide is defined as the negligent unlawful killing of a person.2 The sole difference 
and distinguishing feature between these two crimes, thus, lies in the fault element of the crime 
which determines whether the unlawful conduct was carried out intentionally or negligently.3 
Fault, referred to as the mens rea of the crime, is encapsulated in the Latin maxim ‘actus non 
facit reum, nisi mens sit rea’ which means that ‘an unlawful act does not make a person guilty 
unless the mind is also guilty.’4 In terms of modern criminal law, intention does not mean that 
the accused must have aimed, wanted or meant to commit the crime in question.5 An accused’s 
intention, thus, encompasses his ‘conscious acceptance of such risks of unlawful conduct as he 
foresaw occurring whilst he was pursuing some other aim or object, whether lawful or 
unlawful.’6 MacKinnon7 states that it is this ‘extension of the concept of intention to include 
foreseen consequences which is at the root of the mens rea problem.’ Once we include 
reference to foresight of consequences the blurring of a distinction between intention and 
negligence begins.8  
 
 
                                                          
1 P MacKinnon ‘Two Views of Murder’ (1985) 63 (1) Canadian Bar Review 130.  
2 G Kemp … et al. Criminal Law in South Africa (2012) 30.  
3 Kemp … et al. op cit (n2) 30.  
4 Ibid at 182.  
5 Ibid at 183.  
6 Ibid.  
7 MacKinnon op cit (n1) 132.  
8 Ibid.  
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Intention, also referred to as dolus, may take one of three forms, all of which involve a 
subjective inquiry into the accused’s state of mind. The first form, dolus directus, occurs where 
the commission of the crime was the accused’s actual goal.9 The second form, dolus indirectus, 
occurs where the commission of the crime was not the accused’s main objective, but he foresaw 
it as a virtually certain consequence of attaining that objective and persisted regardless.10 The 
most contentious form, which deviates from intention in its ordinary sense,11 and is the subject 
of this dissertation, is dolus eventualis. At present, South African courts conduct a two-stage 
test to determine whether dolus eventualis exists. The first stage, referred to as the cognitive 
component, asks whether the accused subjectively foresaw the possibility of committing harm. 
The uncertainty associated with the first stage has been succinctly framed in a question by 
Hoctor12 who asks, ‘should the cognitive component be limited to foresight of a real or 
reasonable possibility of harm, or does foresight of a remote possibility suffice for intention?’ 
The second stage, referred to as the conative component, involves the direction of the accused’s 
will towards the foreseen harm.13 Not only has the conative component been labeled an 
unnecessary addition, but a lack of clarity exists as to its exact meaning in that it has been 
variously defined as: ‘recklessness’; ‘reconciliation with the risk of harm’; ‘conscious taking 
of the risk’; ‘persistence in such conduct, despite such foresight’; or a combination of these.14 
Whiting15 correctly points out that:  
 
‘Dolus eventualis has become very much a controversial subject in South Africa of recent 
years. While everyone seems to be agreed that the concept of dolus or intention in the criminal 
law would be too narrow unless it embraced some kind of conscious risk-taking, it is here that 
unanimity ends. As soon as one goes further and asks how wide the concept of dolus eventualis 
should be and what kinds of conscious risk-taking it should encompass, one encounters 
differences in opinion.’ 
 
                                                          
9 Kemp … et al. op cit (n2) 184.  
10 Ibid at 185.  
11 CR Snyman Criminal Law 4ed (2002) 181. 
12 S Hoctor ‘The concept of dolus eventualis in South African law – an historical perspective’ (2008) 14 (2) 
Fundamina: A Journal of Legal History 22. 
13 S Hoctor ‘The degree of foresight in dolus eventualis’ (2013) 26 (2) South African Journal of Criminal Justice 
132-133. 
14 Ibid. 
15 R Whiting ‘Thoughts on Dolus Eventualis’ (1988) 1 (3) South African Journal of Criminal Justice 440.  
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Therefore, although the courts have applied this concept, they have not analysed what it means 
which has left the gap for negligence to become ‘swamped by a distorted dolus eventualis.’16 
Negligence, referred to as culpa, may take one of two forms. The first form, inadvertent 
negligence, occurs where the accused did not subjectively foresee the possibility of his conduct 
being unlawful, but ought to have foreseen it because a reasonable person in the accused’s 
position would have foreseen it and taken reasonable steps to guard against it.17 The second 
form, referred to as conscious (advertent) negligence, occurs where the accused subjectively 
foresaw the remote possibility of his conduct causing death, but unreasonably decides that 
death will not ensue.18 It is therefore evident that both conscious negligence and dolus 
eventualis require actual subjective foresight of possible death ensuing and that the only 
difference lies in the attitude of the accused towards this potential result.19 Consequently, it has 
been argued that the distinction between dolus eventualis and conscious negligence, though 
theoretically precise, is in fact so slight and artificial that it appears unlikely that it would be 
of any help in an actual situation.20 It is for this reason that the distinction between murder and 
culpable has become confused over the years, evident in the courts vacillating21 between 
findings of murder and culpable homicide in cases where the commission of the crime was not 
the accused’s actual aim or intention, but he subjectively foresaw the possibility that his actions 
could result in the death of a person. Therefore, no definitive answer exists to one of the most 
extensively debated questions in criminal law: ‘which consequences foreseen as possible 
should be considered to have been intended?’22  
 
                                                          
16 W Bertelsmann ‘What happened to luxuria – some observations on criminal negligence, recklessness and dolus 
eventualis’ (1975) 92 (1) South African Law Journal 69.  
17 Kemp … et al. op cit (n2) 196.  
18 P Carstens ‘Revisiting the relationship between dolus eventualis and luxuria in context of vehicular collisions 
causing the death of fellow passengers and/or pedestrians: S v Humphreys 2013 (2) SACR 1 (SCA): comment’ 
(2013) 26 (1) South African Journal of Criminal Justice 68.  
19 GJ Brau ‘A Dog Much Confused: The Definition of Intention and Article 15(B) of the Penal Code of Puerto 
Rico’ (1985) 54 (1) Revista Juridica de la Universidad de Puerto Rico 18.  
20 Ibid.    
21 A Paizes ‘Dolus eventualis reconsidered’ (1988) 105 South African Law Journal 636: ‘judicial pronouncements 
on this subject have been characterized by vacillation and a surprising lack of clarity.’  
22 Bertelsmann op cit (n16) 68. 
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Dolus eventualis and conscious negligence are, thus, the two forms of fault which will be 
discussed and analysed in order to find a possible solution to the conflation of the two concepts.  
German law and academic opinion will be consulted because Germany recognises the same 
model of dolus eventualis (bedingter Vorsatz) and conscious negligence (bewuste 
Fahrlassigkeit), and is therefore presented with the same difficulties when trying to demarcate 
these two forms of fault. Furthermore, American law and literature on ‘extreme indifference’ 
murder, which occurs under substantially the same circumstances as dolus eventualis, and its 
distinction from manslaughter, which is the equivalent of culpable homicide, will also be 
looked at for guidance on to how to distinguish cases of murder from culpable homicide where 
it was not the accused’s main objective to cause death, but he foresaw it as a possibility of his 
proposed conduct.  
 
1.2 THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF SOUTH AFRICA  
 
Dolus eventualis forms an integral part of criminal liability in South African criminal law and 
has been recognised by the Constitutional Court in S v Coetzee23 and Thebus v S.24 The test for 
dolus eventualis in the case of murder is governed by the common law and is therefore 
developed by the courts through the doctrine of precedent. Since the case of R v Nsele,25 the 
subjective test for dolus has been applied by South African courts which asks whether the 
accused himself foresaw the consequences of his act.26 Forsyth27 states that the pure 
                                                          
23 1997 (3) SA 527 (CC) para [177]: ‘What is also clear however, from an examination of our law and that of 
foreign jurisdictions is that it is widely recognised (both in our common law and in the law of other countries) 
that the culpability required to establish criminal liability need not in all circumstances be evidenced by direct 
intent (dolus directus) on the part of the accused to commit a criminal act. In our own law other forms of intent, 
such as dolus eventualis, have been recognised as sufficient to meet the requirement of culpability.’ 
24 2003 (6) SA 505 (CC) para [49]: ‘If the prosecution relies on common purpose, it must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that each accused had the requisite mens rea concerning the unlawful outcome at the time the 
offence was committed. That means that he or she must have intended that criminal result or must have foreseen 
the possibility of the criminal result ensuing and nonetheless actively associated himself or herself reckless as to 
whether the result was to ensue.’ 
25 1955 (2) SA 145 (A) at 147C-D.  
26 JM Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 4ed (2013) 353.  
27 ENCA ‘Oscar Pistorius: Is the ‘Link’ in Dolus Eventualis still Missing? (Part 3)’ available at 
http://www.enca.com/opinion/%E2%80%9Coscar-pistorius-link%E2%80%99-dolus-eventualis-still-
missing%E2%80%9D-part-3, accessed on 03 October 2017. 
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subjectivity of the mental element required for murder is one of the ‘great achievements’ of 
legal purism in systems such as South African law.  This means that intention will not exist 
where the accused himself did not foresee the consequences of his actions, but a reasonable 
person would, or ought to, have foreseen them.28 As held in R v K,29 ‘the words knew or ought 
to have known contrast knowledge with a merely reprehensible failure to know and wrongly 
import that either is sufficient for proving intention.’ This is due to the fact that the words 
‘knew or ought to have known’ indicate an objective test which compares the accused’s 
conduct with a standard of conduct that is reasonable in the circumstances. In S v Sigwahla,30 
the Appellate Division held: 
 
‘The fact that objectively the accused ought reasonably to have foreseen such possibility is not 
sufficient. The distinction must be observed between what actually went on in the mind of the 
accused and what would have gone on in the mind of a bonus paterfamilias in the position of 
the accused. In other words, a distinction between subjective foresight and objective 
foreseeability must not become blurred.’ 
 
However, it is often difficult to prove intention where the accused denies that he foresaw the 
risk of harm. Consequently, inferential reasoning is applied in terms of which the court 
attempts to ascertain the accused’s state of mind at the time of committing the crime. The court 
considers all the facts and circumstances that must have been known to the accused, together 
with the manner in which the accused acted with that knowledge, and it draws an inference as 
to whether or not the accused possessed foresight.31 Therefore, Steyn32 states that to establish 
intention, South African criminal law ‘compels a judge to step into the very body, mind and 
soul of the specific accused, with all his or her characteristics and fears, however unreasonable 
or irrational they may be at the time.’ As held in S v Mini,33 ‘a trier of fact should try mentally 
to project himself into the position of that accused at that time.’ In S v Sigwahla,34 the court 
                                                          
28 Burchell op cit (n26) 353. 
29 1956 (3) SA 353 (A) at 356.  
30 1967 (4) SA 566 (A) at 570C-E. 
31 Kemp … et al. op cit (n2) 187.  
32 Oscar Pistorius: Is the ‘Link’ in Dolus Eventualis still Missing? op cit (n27).  
33 1963 (3) SA 188 (A) at 196. 
34 1967 (4) SA 566 (A) at 570E-F. 
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held that ‘to constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt, the inference must be the only one 
which can reasonably be drawn.’ 
 
In the case of a consequence crime, such as murder, it is said that the accused must have 
subjectively foreseen the possibility of killing the deceased or someone in the same position, 
category or class in substantially the same manner as he did kill.35 However, in S v Lungile,36 
although the accused killed the deceased in an unusual manner, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
drew the inference that the accused foresaw this specific manner of death, amongst other 
possibilities. Therefore, Kemp et al37 points out that proving foresight of the causal sequence 
is not likely to be an obstacle in cases where the accused possesses normal intelligence and life 
experience. 
 
The vast majority of cases to date38 have established that the degree of foresight needed to 
establish the cognitive component of dolus eventualis is merely ‘the possibility of harm 
occurring.’39 In terms of Black’s Law Dictionary, ‘possibility’ has been defined as ‘an 
uncertain thing which may happen’40 and therefore the harm which results need not have been 
a certain result of the accused’s conduct, but there exists a chance that it may or may not ensue. 
In R v Horn,41 it was held that ‘it would be incongruous to limit a wrongdoer’s constructive 
intent to cases where the result which he has foreseen was likely to cause death.’ As such, the 
foresight requirement has been framed in unqualified terms.42 In S v De Bruyn,43 the Appellate 
Division held, obiter, ‘[i]f under cross-examination, an accused were to admit that he foresaw 
the possibility of death, on the footing that anything is possible, that would contribute to a 
                                                          
35 Kemp … et al. op cit (n2) 187.  
36 1999 (2) SACR 597 (SCA) paras [15] – [18].  
37 Kemp … et al. op cit (n2) 190.  
38 S v Mbatha 1987 (2) SA 272 (A) at 285; S v Nomakhlala 1990 (1) SACR 300 (A) at 303; S v Nango 1990 (2) 
SACR 450 (A) at 457; S v Dlamini 1991 (2) SACR 655 (A) at 664-5; S v Morgan 1993 (2) SACR 134 (A) at 174; 
S v Terre Blanche 2001 JDR 0134 (SCA) para [6]; S v Erasmus 2005 (2) SACR 658 (SCA) para [10]; S v Molimi 
2006 (2) SACR 8 (SCA) para [35]. 
39 Hoctor op cit (n13) 136. 
40 The Law Dictionary ‘What is Possibility?’ available at http://thelawdictionary.org/possibility/, accessed on 02nd 
August 2017. 
41 1958 (3) SA 457 at 467B. 
42 Hoctor op cit (n13) 137.  
43 1968 (4) SA 498 (A) at 511. 
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conviction of murder.’ However, there does exist authority for foresight of a reasonable or real 
possibility and the South African courts waver between, on the one hand, recognising foresight 
of a remote possibility and, on the other, demanding foresight of a real, reasonable or 
substantial possibility.44 In S v Cameron,45 the Supreme Court of Appeal held that for dolus 
eventualis to be present, the accused must have ‘subjectively appreciated the reasonable 
possibility.’ In S v Ostilly,46 the court held that to prove dolus eventualis ‘it must be shown that 
a real possibility of that consequence resulting was foreseen.’ Therefore, Hoctor47 points out 
that the courts have on occasion qualified the degree of foresight required for dolus eventualis. 
However, they have not authoritatively dismissed requiring an unqualified degree of foresight 
for liability to arise, which adds to the confusion surrounding the test for dolus eventualis.  
 
The conative component of dolus eventualis was effectively introduced into our law in 1945 
by the case of R v Valachia48 in which Greenberg JA relied on Section 140 of the Transkeian 
Penal Code (Act 24 of 1886, Cape) to support his finding that murder will have been committed 
where it is proved, by inference, that the accused caused death to another by conduct which 
they ‘must have known to be of such a dangerous character that death would be likely to result 
therefrom, and were reckless whether it did so or not.’ Greenberg JA49 stated: 
 
‘It is interesting to see that sec. 140 of the Transkeian Penal Code … which has not infrequently 
been found to have incorporated in its provisions the correct view of what our law is, provides 
that culpable homicide becomes murder in a number of cases, one of which is that “if the 
offender means to cause the person killed any bodily injury, which is known to the offender to 
be likely to cause death, and if the offender, whether he does or does not mean to cause death, 
is reckless whether death ensues or not.”’ 
 
 
                                                          
44 Burchell op cit (n26) 357.  
45 2005 (2) SACR 179 (SCA) at 183F-G.  
46 1977 (4) SA 699 (D) at 728D-E.  
47 Hoctor op cit (n13) 145.  
48 1945 AD 826 at 831.  
49 Ibid.   
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Therefore, the ‘recklessness’ contained in the conative component entails that the accused 
subjectively reconciled himself to the possibility of death ensuing50 which means that the 
accused decided to proceed with his action despite foreseeing the possibility that death may 
follow. To him it was immaterial whether death resulted from his actions or not51 and he did 
not allow the possibility of killing another human being to deter him from his proposed course 
of conduct. In other words, he consciously accepted the risk.52 There is rarely direct evidence 
of the existence of the conative component and therefore it is inferred from the accused’s 
deliberation and preparation, together with a failure to render assistance.53 An array of 
terminology exists to describe the conative component ranging from, as was held in Boshoff v 
Boshoff,54 ‘eager desire at the one end and passive and reluctant acquiescence at the other.’ 
Some judgments55 refer to the conative component as ‘insensitive recklessness’ or ‘callous 
indifference’ but Kemp et al56 states that this is misleading. The accused’s feelings towards 
the risk is irrelevant when determining the conative component and it is irrelevant whether the 
accused was hoping that the risk would not materialise.57 What matters is simply that the 
accused consciously proceeded to take the risk. As held in R v Peverett:58 
 
‘In law desire must be distinguished from intention. The consequences which a man 
contemplates or expects to result from his act are the consequences which he “intends”, but … 
such consequences may not always be desired. Though a desired consequence is usually an 
intended one, an intended consequence is not always a desired one.’ 
 
The test for culpa, in the context of culpable homicide, originates in the common law and is 
thus continually developed by the courts. In order to determine whether the accused was 
negligent, the court measures the foresight and conduct of the accused with that of the 
reasonable man, which asks whether a reasonable person in the position of the accused would 
                                                          
50 Carstens op cit (n18) 68.  
51 CR Snyman Criminal Law 6ed (2015) 181.  
52 Ibid.   
53 M Loubser & M Rabie ‘Defining Dolus Eventualis: A Voluntative Element’ (1988) 1 (3) South African Journal 
of Criminal Justice 420.  
54 1987 (2) SA 694 (O) at 699-700.  
55 S v De Bruyn en ‘n Ander 1968 (4) SA 498 (A); S v Mavhungu 1981 (1) SA 56 (A).  
56 Kemp … et al. op cit (n2) 190.  
57 Ibid. 
58 1940 AD 213 at 219. 
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have foreseen the harm ensuing and taken steps to prevent it. In the delictual case of Herschel 
v Mrupe,59 the Appellate Division held that: 
 
‘The reasonable person is not a timorous faintheart always in trepidation lest he or other suffer 
some injury; on the contrary, he ventures out into the world, engages in affairs and takes 
reasonable chances.’ 
 
Furthermore, in S v Burger,60 Holmes JA states: 
 
‘One does not expect of a diligens paterfamilias (the reasonable man) any extremes such as 
Solomonic wisdom, prophetic foresight, chameleonic caution, headlong haste, nervous 
timidity, or the trained reflexes of a racing driver. In short, a diligens paterfamilias treads life's 
pathway with moderation and prudent common sense.’ 
 
The relationship between dolus and culpa has become a grey area of law since the decision of 
S v Ngubane61 in which the Appellate Division held that ‘a man may foresee the possibility of 
harm and yet be negligent in respect of that harm ensuing.’ Therefore, the court went on to say 
that ‘the concept of conscious negligence clearly establishes that foresight per se does not 
exclude negligence.’62 Conscious negligence occurs when the accused foresaw only a remote 
possibility of harm ensuing, but unreasonably trusts or is confident that the harm will not occur, 
and therefore failed to take the steps that a reasonable person would have taken to prevent 
harm.63 Kemp et al64 states that the greater the risk of the possibility of death ensuing, the 
greater the duty placed on a person to prevent the possibility from materialising. Conscious 
negligence therefore differs from traditional objective negligence which, in most cases, 
consists of inadvertence on the part of the accused and a failure to measure up to the foresight 
required of the reasonable person.65 However, the courts scarcely refer to conscious negligence 
and the most commonly quoted passages on conscious negligence come from S v Van Zyl66 in 
which the Appellate Division held that an accused who foresaw the harm may be guilty of 
                                                          
59 1954 (3) SA 464 (A) at 477.   
60 1975 (4) SA 877 (A) at 879D-E.  
61 1985 (3) SA 677 (A) at 685A-B.  
62 Ibid at 686B-C.  
63 Burchell op cit (n26) 373.  
64 Kemp… et al. op cit (n2) 201.  
65 Burchell op cit (n26) 374.  
66 1969 (1) SA 553 (AD).  
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negligence only. Therefore, the main difference between dolus eventualis and conscious 
negligence, in terms of the current legal framework, rests on whether the accused reconciled 
himself to the foreseen possibility, irrespective of the degree of foresight.   
 
1.3. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF GERMANY AND AMERICA  
 
The German concepts of bedingter Vorsatz and bewuste Fahralssigkeit are almost identical to 
the South African concepts of dolus eventualis and conscious negligence respectively. 
Furthermore, American ‘extreme indifference’ murder occurs under substantially the same 
circumstances as dolus eventualis and its distinction from cases of manslaughter, the equivalent 
of culpable homicide in South Africa, has become contested. It is therefore beneficial to consult 
German and American law and academic opinion in order to establish how they have dealt 
with the conflation of murder and negligent killings.  
 
1.3.1. ‘Bedingter Vorsatz’ and ‘Bewuste Fahrlassigkeit’ in Germany   
 
In German law, intention consists of two elements: the accused must have been aware that his 
conduct fulfilled the definition of a crime, and it must have been his will to do so.67 Germany, 
like South Africa, recognises three forms of intent. In the first form, direct intent of the first 
degree, the accused’s will was to commit a crime, irrespective of foresight. In the second form, 
direct intent of the second degree, the accused knew or foresaw as certain that, as a result of 
engaging in certain conduct, he would commit a crime. The last form, bedingter Vorsatz, the 
German equivalent of dolus eventualis, exists when the accused foresaw as a possible result of 
his actions that harm would be caused to another and approved or reconciled himself to that 
possibility.68 Therefore, the first leg of the test is concerned with the knowledge and assessment 
of the possibility of harm by the accused and the second leg is concerned with the accused’s 
attitude towards the harm.69 In the Stakic judgment,70 the definition of dolus eventualis in 
                                                          
67 J Zekoll & M Reimann Introduction to German Law 2ed (2005) 392.  
68 Ibid.  
69 G Taylor ‘Concepts of Intention in German Criminal Law’ (2004) 24 (1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
109-110.  
70 Prosecutor v. Stakic Judgment Case No. IT-97-24-T ICTY Trial Chamber 31 July 2003 para 587.  
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German criminal law was described as follows: ‘if the actor engages in life-threatening 
behaviour, his killing becomes intentional if he reconciles  himself or makes peace  with the 
likelihood of death.’ Therefore, Taylor71 states that the crucial question is whether the accused 
was ‘prepared to run the risk, knowing that it might materialise and being reconciled to that 
possibility?’ The accused’s motive has no bearing on criminal liability and therefore whether 
the accused desired the outcome or not is irrelevant.  
 
Germany also recognises conscious negligence, called bewuste Fahrlassigkeit, which contains 
the same intellectual element as dolus eventualis: the accused is guilty for having carried on 
conduct despite realising that such conduct could lead to unlawful consequences.72 However, 
dolus eventualis entails the accused having approved of the possible consequences, whereas in 
the case of conscious negligence, the accused disapproved of them and was confident or had 
reason to believe that such a consequence would not occur.73 Therefore, the crucial question 
to be asked is ‘did the accused lull [him]self into a false sense of security, going ahead with 
[his] plan in the firm belief that the risk would not materialise.’74 Accordingly, the accused 
who recognised the risk of harmful consequences of his actions, but unreasonably relied on 
their non-occurrence will have acted with conscious negligence.75 This means that a distinction 
is drawn between Hoffen (hope) and Vertrauen (reliance): the hope that foreseen consequences 
will not ensue does not eliminate intent, but reliance on the possibility of avoiding or 
preventing these consequences, whether rational or not, does eliminate intent.76 Taylor77 
provides an example to illustrate the distinction between bedingter Vorsatz and bewuste 
Fahralssigkeit under German law: 
 
‘One example that is commonly used is that of a driver overtaking on a road with insufficient 
opportunity to check for oncoming traffic. Such a driver, if competent, will realise the 
                                                          
71 Taylor op cit (n69) 110.  
72 D Morkel ‘On the Distinction between Recklessness and Conscious Negligence [comments]’ (1982) 30 (2) 
American Journal of Comparative Law 328.  
73 Zekoll & Reimann op cit (n67) 392-3.  
74 Taylor op cit (n69) 110.  
75 C Roxin ‘The Dogmatic Structure of Criminal Liability in the General Part of the Draft Israel Penal Code - A 
Comparison with German Law’ (1996) 30 (1 & 2) Israel Law Review 68.  
76 Ibid 
77 Taylor op cit (n69) 109.  
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possibility that someone might be coming the other way, and thus will fulfill the first criterion 
of dolus eventualis. But, unless suicidal, he will not fulfill the second, for he will neither 
approve of the possibility of an accident nor reconcile himself to it. Rather, he will trust in his 
luck and rely earnestly on the non-occurrence of an accident. Thus, our driver acts only with 
advertent negligence.’ 
 
1.3.2. ‘Extreme Indifference’ Murder in America  
 
Under American law, an accused possesses intent to murder when he either desired to kill or 
knew that his conduct was certain to result in death.78 ‘Reckless’ killings in which the accused 
consciously and unjustifiably risked killing another human being are punished as 
manslaughter, which is the South African equivalent of culpable homicide.79 Between 
intentional murder and manslaughter lies ‘extreme indifference’ murder which comprises 
killings that occur without intention, but ‘deserve society's harshest punishment’.80 Section 
210.2 (1) (b) of the Model Penal Code,81 which is referred to as the ‘central document of 
American criminal justice’,82 defines ‘extreme indifference’ murder as a homicide that ‘is 
committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of 
human life.’ The distinguishing feature between manslaughter and ‘extreme indifference’ 
murder is therefore the accused’s ‘extreme indifference to the value of human life.’ According 
to Section 2.02 of the Code: 
 
‘[a] person acts recklessly... when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk 
that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the 
circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of 
conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation.’ 
 
Therefore, with regard to the gravity and utility of the risks, the Code uses the words 
‘substantial’ and ‘unjustifiable’. Taking a risk of death, thus, does not raise a question of 
liability unless the risk is substantial and ‘the social costs outweigh the benefits of the risk.’83 
                                                          
78 AC Michaels ‘Defining Unintended Murder’ (1985) 85 (4) Columbia Law Review 787.  
79 Ibid.  
80 Ibid. 
81 Hereinafter referred to as the Code.  
82 GP Fletcher ‘Dogmas of the Model Penal Code’ (1998) 2 (1) Buffalo Criminal Law Review 3.  
83 GP Fletcher Rethinking Criminal Law (1978) 261.  
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However, the drafters did not provide a definition for the phrase ‘extreme indifference to the 
value of human life.’ The commentary to Section 210.2 (1) (b) of the Code points out that the 
drafters intended ‘extreme indifference’ murder to cover homicides that fall short of the mens 
rea required for ‘knowingly’,84 but are more severe than manslaughter.85 This has provided 
little guidance and States have taken numerous and differing approaches in attempting to define 
‘extreme indifference’ murder, which will be discussed in chapter two.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
1.4.      MOTIVATION FOR THE RESEARCH  
 
Considering the lack of clarity surrounding the test for dolus eventualis, which has resulted in 
a conflation of intention and negligence in cases where an accused foresaw that his conduct 
could result in death but nevertheless proceeded, I was motivated to examine the current test 
for dolus eventualis in the case of murder and to determine its sufficiency and whether it can 
be distinguished from culpa, in the case of culpable homicide. This determination will be 
arrived at by consulting not only South African law and academic opinion but also that of 
Germany and America.  
 
1.5. THE RESEARCH QUESTION  
 
The research question in this dissertation is as follows: 
 
To determine whether the current test for dolus eventualis is sufficient in the case of 
murder and whether it can be distinguished from culpa in cases of culpable homicide 
by conducting comparative research of German and American law and academic 
opinion?  
 
                                                          
84 Section 2.02 of the Model Penal Code states that a person acts ‘knowingly’ with respect to a material element 
of the crime when: ‘(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances, he is 
aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and (ii) if the element involves a result 
of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause death.’ This form of intention 
therefore mirrors dolus indirectus under South African law.  
85 JC Duffy ‘Reality Check: How Practical Circumstances Affect the Interpretation of Depraved Indifference 
Murder’ (2007) 57 (2) Duke Law Journal 429.  
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1.6. OBJECTIVES  
 
1.6.1. To discuss the background and current legal framework of South Africa relating to 
dolus eventualis and culpa, Germany relating to bedingter Vorsatz and bewuste 
Fahrlassigkeit, and America relating to ‘extreme indifference’ murder and 
manslaughter;  
 
1.6.2. To discuss the literature in South Africa on dolus eventualis and culpa, with a specific 
focus on Germany’s bedingter Vorsatz and bewuste Fahrlassigkeit, and America’s 
‘extreme indifference’ murder and manslaughter; 
 
1.6.3. To discuss case law in South Africa on the distinction between dolus eventualis and 
culpa, in Germany on the distinction between bedingter Vorsatz and bewuste 
Fahrlassigkeit, and in America on the demarcation of ‘extreme indifference’ murder 
from manslaughter;  
 
1.6.4. To discuss and analyse the findings of the above as well as put forward 
recommendations for dolus eventualis.   
 
1.7. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The methodology adopted in this dissertation is desktop-based (digital and manual). The data 
comprises case law, textbooks and journal articles. Reference is made to the current legal 
framework, literature and case law of Germany and America. Therefore, comparative research 
is conducted.  
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1.8. CHAPTER SUMMARY   
 
Dolus eventualis has been correctly described as ‘a concept which can with justification be 
described as an enigma.’86 Such justification is based on the fact that the courts have applied 
the two-stage test, the cognitive and conative component respectively, without providing an 
in-depth analysis of what each component means. With regard to the cognitive component, the 
lack of clarity lies in the degree of foresight which is required. Paizes87 summaries the 
controversy surrounding this component by asking, ‘must there be foresight of a ‘real’ or 
‘substantial’ possibility of that consequence occurring, or does it suffice that there be foresight 
of a slight or remote possibility?’ It is one of the aims of this dissertation to provide an answer 
to this question. The conative component has not only been variously described, but has been 
labelled as ‘superfluous’ and therefore this dissertation aims to ascertain the correct definition 
and if, indeed, it is necessary. These ‘flaws’ which have been identified by legal academics has 
left the gap for dolus eventualis to be conflated and confused with culpa, especially conscious 
negligence, because both contain subjective foresight of a remote possibility. The 
abovementioned problems are not only applicable to South African law, but German law is 
faced with the same questions and lack of clarity when trying to demarcate bedingter Vorsatz 
from bewuste Fahrlassigkeit, as well as American law when trying to distinguish cases of 
manslaughter from ‘extreme indifference’ murder. Therefore, a literature review will be 
conducted and case law discussed from South Africa, Germany and America in order to find 
possible solutions to the existing lack of clarity and confusion surrounding the test for dolus 
eventualis where an accused is charged with murder.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
86 Focus ‘Dolus eventualis’ (1988) 1 SACJ 414.  
87 Paizes op cit (n21) 636.  
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1.9. CHAPTER BREAKDOWN  
 
i.  Chapter One: This chapter provides the introduction, background and current legal 
framework governing dolus eventualis and culpa as well as their relationship in South 
Africa. Furthermore, the current legal framework governing bedingter Vorsatz and 
bewuste Fahrlassigkeit in Germany as well as ‘extreme indifference’ murder and 
manslaughter in America will be discussed. This chapter also provides the motivation, 
research question, objectives, research methodology and a chapter breakdown. 
 
ii.  Chapter Two: This chapter will provide a literature review of the relationship between 
dolus eventualis and culpa, seeking to demonstrate and discuss the current shortfalls and 
problems identified by prominent criminal law authors, as well the main solutions that 
have been proposed. Theories from Germany on bedingter Vorsatz and bewuste 
Fahrlassigkeit and the divergent state approaches from America on ‘extreme 
indifference’ murder will also be discussed in order to find possible solutions. 
 
iii.  Chapter Three: This chapter will provide a discussion of South African case law in 
which the distinction between dolus eventualis and culpa has been in issue, German case 
law in which the distinction between bedingter Vorsatz and bewuste Fahrlassigkeit has 
been in issue, as well as American case law on the distinction between ‘extreme 
indifference’ murder and manslaughter.  
 
iv.  Chapter Four: This chapter will comprise a concluding argument and analysis drawn 
from the preceding discussion, an answer to the research question proposed, as well as 
any recommendations and reforms that need to be applied to the current test of dolus 
eventualis.  
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CHAPTER TWO  
LITERATURE REVIEW  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION  
 
While the definition of dolus eventualis in South African criminal law is contested amongst 
academics, Hoctor88 proposes that an examination of academic opinion may provide valuable 
and persuasive authority which could assist in finding a solution to the current theoretical 
obstacles surrounding the subject. Therefore, this chapter will provide a literature review which 
seeks to demonstrate and discuss the current shortfalls associated with the two-stage test for 
dolus eventualis, the cognitive and conative component, as well as any solutions that have been 
identified by academics. Comparative research will be conducted by consulting academic 
opinion from Germany on the demarcation of bedingter Vorsatz and bewuste Fahrlassigkeit 
and from America on the distinction between ‘extreme indifference’ murder and manslaughter.  
 
2.2. THE COGNITIVE COMPONENT OF DOLUS EVENTUALIS   
 
One of the most contentious debates surrounding dolus eventualis is the degree of foresight 
required for the cognitive component. The question posed by Burchell89 is: ‘given that 
foresight of a possibility will constitute intention in the form of dolus eventualis, does it follow 
that even the most remote and unlikely possibility, if foreseen, must be taken to have been 
intended?’  There exist arguments both in favour of foresight of a real, reasonable or substantial 
possibility and those which favour a remote possibility. 
 
 
 
                                                          
88 Hoctor op cit (n12) 23.   
89 Burchell op cit (n26) 356. 
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Whiting90 correctly comments that ‘a remarkable disparity’ exists between the statement that 
foresight of a remote possibility is sufficient for dolus eventualis and the degree of foresight 
that is, in practice, applied by the courts. Paizes91 states that in no case has the accused been 
convicted of murder where he foresaw death as a remote and not as a real possibility. Therefore, 
it is argued that the courts only find dolus eventualis to be present when the accused foresaw 
death as a real or substantial possibility. Burchell and Hunt92 state that due to the court’s 
implicit rejection of a remote possibility, the minimum degree of foresight required is foresight 
of a substantial or real possibility which will confine intention ‘to a state of mind that can 
properly be regarded as such and keep the dividing line between intention and negligence 
clearcut.’ Burchell93 states that where an accused foresaw the possibility of harm materialising 
as something less than a real possibility, but instead as a remote possibility, conscious 
negligence rather than dolus eventualis would be present and the accused would be found 
guilty of culpable homicide:  
 
‘[I]f … legal intention is confined to subjective foresight of a real possibility and if foresight of a 
lesser degree is regarded as conscious negligence, there could be no objection, in the latter kind of 
case, to liability being dependent upon the taking of an objectively justifiable risk, for an important 
issue in a case of negligence is whether a reasonable man would have guarded against the risk in 
question. Thus, where X causes the death of Y which X foresees as a remote possibility his liability 
for culpable homicide would turn upon whether or not his taking of the risk of Y’s death was 
justified, judged by the objective standard. In deciding this question many factors would be 
relevant, eg the degree of remoteness of the risk, whether the risk which the accused takes has a 
social value which outweighs the social harm of the danger inherent in the risk, the urgent and 
laudable action in which the accused is engaged and whether the precautions may have been so 
difficult, inconvenient and costly that a reasonable man would not have guarded against the 
slightest possibility of even a fatal accident.’94 
 
 
 
                                                          
90 Whiting op cit (n15) 444. 
91 Paizes op cit (n21) 637.  
92 EM Burchell & PMA Hunt South African Criminal Law and Procedure Vol I: General Principles of Criminal 
Law 2ed (by EM Burchell, JRL Milton & JM Burchell) (1983) 146 – 147.  
93 Burchell and Hunt op cit (n92) 148 – 150.   
94 Ibid at 154-155.  
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Providing a practical example in support of the contention that foresight of a remote possibility 
should only be restricted to cases of culpable homicide, Burchell writes: 95 
  
‘If, for example, X overtook a car on a blind rise and collided with an oncoming car driven by Y 
as a result of which Y was killed, apart from the question of recklessness, X’s liability for culpable 
homicide or murder would depend upon the degree of his foresight. If he merely foresaw Y’s death 
as a remote possibility he would at most be guilty of culpable homicide.’ 
 
There exists merit in the argument proposing that foresight of a real or substantial possibility 
be confined to murder, while foresight of a remote possibility be confined to culpable 
homicide. Negligence is referred to as the ‘junior partner’96 of dolus because not only does it 
require a lower level of culpability, but it also involves a lesser sentence. It follows that dolus, 
involving a higher degree of stigma, harsher sentences and requiring a higher level of 
culpability, should as a result require a higher degree of foresight than negligence. It is 
imperative that the definition of murder should ensure that those convicted of murder will be 
deserving of the stigma associated with it.97 Therefore, Whiting98 argues that ‘in order to put 
the law on a sound footing, it will be necessary to reject the notion that the foresight required 
for dolus eventualis need not be of anything more than a remote possibility as being far too 
wide.’ It has been argued that expanding the scope of murder would not only be unjust but 
would also diminish the stigma to which society attaches value.99 Morkel100 expands on this 
by arguing that if foresight of a remote possibility constitutes sufficient foresight for dolus, 
then an accused could be held liable for murder where his conduct did not even fall short of 
the reasonable person. This could lead to ‘anomalous and unjust results’101 because by 
extending the scope of foresight to a bare possibility for murder wrongful convictions could 
ensue.  
                                                          
95 Ibid at 147.  
96 R Whiting ‘Negligence, Fault and Criminal Liability’ (1991) 108 (3) South African Law Journal 431: ‘of the 
two recognised forms of fault or mens rea, intention (dolus) and negligence (culpa), negligence is in more than 
one sense the junior partner.’ 
97 NK Thomson ‘Fundamental Justice, Stigma and Fault’ (1994) 52 (2) University of Toronto Faculty of Law 
Review 388.  
98 Whiting op cit (n15) 445-6. 
99 Thomson op cit (n97) 388.  
100 Hoctor op cit (n13) 138.   
101 Burchell and Hunt op cit (n92) 146.  
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Burchell and Hunt102 state: 
 
‘if applied, it would lessen confidence in the administration of justice, for it extends the scope of 
intention to embrace a state of mind which cannot properly be classified as intention at all. It is 
doubtful whether X can even be said to ‘foresee’ a possibility if he thinks of it but considers it very 
remote; and surely he cannot be said to ‘intend’ a consequence, even in the legal sense of intention 
(assuming the element of recklessness is present), if he foresees it only as a very remote risk, or as 
a hundred-to-one chance, or, to use Holmes JA’s own words, ‘on the footing that anything is 
possible.’’ 
 
However, according to Glanville Williams,103 and endorsed by Pain, 104 foresight of a bare 
possibility is sufficient to convict for dolus only if the accused’s ‘conduct has no social utility, 
but that the slightest social utility of the conduct will introduce an inquiry into the degree of 
probability of harm and a balancing of this hazard against its social utility.’ Therefore, 
Whiting105 suggests that one of the factors to be considered when determining whether dolus 
eventualis exists is the type of activity involved. Whiting106 states that there are many activities 
which are socially and legally acceptable, notwithstanding that they do involve a risk of harm 
to others. The most common example which he provides is driving a car and states that because 
of its social utility the law encourages it but circumscribes the manner in which it may be 
performed so as to limit its possibility for causing harm.107 Whiting108 goes on to say:  
 
‘There can be no question of liability where a person performs such an activity in a manner 
permitted by the law even though he realises that what he is doing involves some risk to the lives 
of others. But what if a person performs such an activity in a manner forbidden by the law, as where 
he drives his car at a substantially excessive speed? Here it might well be possible for it to be proved 
against him not only that he knew he was driving at a substantially excessive speed but also that he 
realised that in so doing he was endangering the lives of others to a degree which was clearly 
impermissible. Yet if this were to be proved and if in addition such driving had resulted in an 
accident in which someone else was killed, one's sense of what is right would surely be very 
considerably offended by any suggestion that this would make him guilty of murder. One would 
say that he lacked dolus eventualis and would be guilty merely of culpable homicide, 
                                                          
102 Ibid. 
103 GL Williams Criminal Law: The General Part 1ed (1953) 55. 
104 JH Pain ‘Some Reflections on our Criminal Law’ (1960) Acta Juridica 301.  
105 Whiting op cit (n15) 440.  
106 Ibid.  
107 Whiting op cit (n15) 441.  
108 Ibid.    
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notwithstanding that he actually foresaw, albeit only as a rather slight possibility, that someone 
might be killed by his dangerous driving.’ 
 
Therefore, although Whiting109 favours foresight of a substantial possibility, he states that 
foresight of a remote possibility will suffice when the conduct involved has no social utility, 
but ‘it is the accused’s purpose to expose the victim to the risk of death.’ Paizes110 states:  
 
‘It is true that if you commit an act that has no social utility and that is inherently dangerous and 
prima facie unlawful, such as hitting another person on the head with a heavy object, you will have 
dolus eventualis in respect of that person’s death if you go ahead with the act after you have 
foreseen the possibility of causing that result. But it is not true if you run a huge mining operation 
(which is inherently dangerous, has social utility and is not prima facie unlawful) with a similar 
state of mind. If it were, then you would be guilty of attempted murder every time a miner went 
down your mine and all mining operations would have to close. In addition, driving a car would 
attract a similar treatment, and transport would cease to function.’ 
 
Based on the above arguments, Snyman111 uses the example of driving a car to argue against a 
broad interpretation of dolus eventualis involving foresight of a remote possibility due to the 
fact that every driver is aware of the possibility, however slight, that their driving may cause 
death to another human being. Therefore, in most car accidents, and dictated by human 
experience, the accused foresees death not as a real or substantial possibility, but as a chance 
occurrence.112 As Hoctor asks, 113 ‘should every driver who causes death then be charged with 
the crime of murder, with the associated heavy sentence and stigma that follows a conviction 
for murder?’ However, Burchell and Hunt114 state that, in the event of a fatality from a car 
accident, ‘if in the circumstances (eg the narrowness of the road, the heavy volume of traffic 
at the time, etc) he foresaw Y’s death as a real possibility, a verdict of murder would be 
justified.’ Whiting115 states that a verdict of murder would be justified where the driver 
                                                          
109 Hoctor op cit (n23) 139.  
110 A Paizes ‘Dolus eventualis: Two more decisions by the Supreme Court of Appeal’ (2016) 1 Criminal Justice 
Review.  
111 CR Snyman Criminal Law 3ed (1995) 183. 
112 CR Snyman Criminal Law 5ed (2008) 185. 
113 S Hoctor ‘General Principles and Specific Offences’ (2012) 25 (3) South African Journal of Criminal Justice 
398.  
114 Burchell op cit (n26) 373. 
115 Whiting op cit (n15) 441.   
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deliberately took a specific concrete risk. Whiting116 in this regard distinguishes a risk of a 
generalised statistical nature, such as speeding or driving with defective brakes, from a specific 
concrete risk by providing the following example:  
 
‘A driver who wishes to make a quick getaway drives straight at a person standing in his path, 
hoping that he will get out of the way but realising that unless he manages to do this he will be hit 
and perhaps killed. Here the risk to the other person's life which the driver has knowingly taken is 
of so immediate and concrete a nature that he may well be held to have acted with dolus eventualis 
in relation to the other's death, with the result that if the other person was actually killed he would 
be guilty of murder.’ 
 
Associated words with ‘concrete’ include ‘certain’, ‘real’, and ‘substantial’117 and 
consequently this type of risk taken by the accused indicates that he possessed foresight of a 
real or substantial possibility of death ensuing. It can, further, be argued, relying on inferential 
reasoning and the dicta of S v Mini118 in which ‘a trier of fact should try mentally to project 
himself into the position of that accused at that time’ that the accused did, in fact, accept that 
possibility into the bargain. This is because human experience dictates that an accused who 
drives straight into a person cannot unreasonably trust that the person will move out of the 
way, but can merely hope.  
 
However, Van Oosten119 states that if only foresight of a real probability constitutes foresight 
for the purposes of dolus eventualis, and an accused who possesses foresight as something less 
could only be found guilty based on conscious negligence, then even if the accused has 
accepted that possibility into the bargain, there would be no dolus eventualis. According to this 
view, requiring foresight of a real or substantial possibility for a conviction limits the 
application of dolus eventualis. However, as argued above, should this limitation not be in 
place to prevent wrongful convictions? Engers120 argues that ‘to say that foresight of a remote 
                                                          
116 Whiting op cit (n15) 442.   
117 The Free Dictionary by Farlex ‘Concrete’ available at http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/concrete, 
accessed on 2 July 2017. 
118 1963 (3) SA 188 (A) at 196E-F.  
119 FFW van Oosten ‘Dolus eventualis en luxuria – nog ‘n stuiwer in die armbeurs’ (1982) 45 Tydskrif vir 
hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 189.   
120 KAB Engers ‘Dolus eventualis – which way now?’ (1973) Responsa Meridiana 223.  
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possibility is not foresight is straining both language and logic.’ He goes on to say that ‘no 
matter how unlikely such occurrence, the moment he contemplates that it may occur he 
foresees it as a possibility.’121 Du Plessis122 supports this by stating that ‘a possibility actually 
foreseen no matter how remote, is a possibility and suffices for dolus eventualis.’ Therefore, 
according to these views, the moment that the accused foresees the slightest chance that his 
conduct might result in death, the cognitive component of dolus eventualis has been satisfied 
and the court will then ask whether the accused accepted that possibility. Therefore, Hoctor123 
argues that ‘provided the foresight is of an actually existing possibility, whether it is labelled 
‘reasonable’ or ‘remote’ matters not for the purposes of liability.’ Tsuro124 favours this view, 
but correctly points out that ‘there may still be concerns that adopting this approach may open 
the floodgates of liability for crimes such as murder.’ She goes on to discount these concerns 
by stating that the fact that the probability of harm ensuing will be relevant in drawing an 
inference of foresight on the part of the accused indicates that the more improbable the harm, 
the more difficult it will be to prove that the accused possessed foresight.125 As Hoctor126 states, 
‘one must guard against confusion between aspects of principle and aspects of proof.’ 
However, this line of reasoning can equally support the view that foresight of a remote 
possibility is not sufficient for a conviction of murder, and that, in fact, the courts will not find 
dolus eventualis to be present where the foresight of harm occurring was remote because a 
person of normal intelligence cannot accept, and therefore intend, that death will ensue where 
they foresee it as a remote happening. Tsuro127 provides us with a second safeguard in that the 
remoteness of the foreseen possibility could be a mitigating factor when sentencing the 
accused. Van Niekerk128 in this regard states that remoteness of the possibility may be relevant 
to the punishment imposed but it can never affect criminal liability because the accused 
knowingly chose to take the risk, however remote, and therefore has a ‘callous disregard for 
                                                          
121 Ibid at 221.  
122 JR Du Plessis The Law of Culpable Homicide in South Africa (unpublished PhD thesis, Rhodes University, 
1986) 153.  
123 Hoctor op cit (n13) 153.  
124 JA Tsuro An Alternative Approach to Dolus Eventualis (published LLM thesis, University of KwaZulu-Natal, 
2016) 104.  
125 Ibid.  
126 Hoctor op cit (n13) 152.  
127 Tsuro op cit (n124) 104.  
128 BvD van Niekerk ‘Dolus eventualis revisited’ (1969) 86 South African Law Journal 140.  
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the possibility of the harm occurring.’ However, this line of reasoning is flawed because there 
is a failure to consider the stigma of the term ‘murderer’ that will be attached to the accused. 
Due to the high degree of stigma associated with a conviction for murder, the principles of 
fundamental justice require a level of mens rea which correctly reflects the nature of murder.129 
Can foresight of a remote chance of death occurring reflect a level of mens rea which is 
sufficient for murder? Can an accused possess a ‘callous’ disregard for the possibility if it is 
only remote? As Paizes130 correctly points out, ‘foresight of a remote possibility of death 
ordinarily signifies a less blameworthy mental condition than foresight of the real possibility 
of death.’ According to the Oxford Thesaurus, synonyms for the word ‘remote’ include 
‘improbable’, ‘insignificant’ and, most importantly, ‘inconsiderable’131. Consequently, 
‘remote’ suggests that the accused foresaw the harm as improbable, insignificant and so slight 
so as to not accept that it will happen. Therefore, it can be argued that requiring merely a remote 
degree of foresight for dolus eventualis does not sufficiently reflect a level of mens rea that is 
sufficient for murder and the stigma attached.  
 
According to Hoctor,132 the argument that foresight of a remote possibility is never applied in 
our courts is open to doubt. He refers to S v Nkosi133 in which the court accepted that the 
accused were convicted on the basis of foresight of ‘no more than a remote possibility.’ 
Furthermore, in S v Mazibuko,134 the court refers to the court a quo’s decision to convict the 
accused of murder where ‘the death of the deceased was foreseen as no more than a remote 
possibility.’ However, it is instructive that in both of these cases, the accused’s conduct had no 
social utility and deadly weapons, namely firearms, were used which the accused would have 
foreseen, that if used, would pose a real, reasonable or substantial possibility of death. 
Weldon135 argues that ‘everyone knows that some weapons, such as loaded guns, and certain 
other instruments, such as stones, when used in a dangerous manner, are likely to produce 
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death.’ It is contended that where a deadly weapon is utilised or an instrument is used in a 
deadly manner by the accused, unless it is proved otherwise, inferential reasoning dictates that 
the accused must have foreseen the real, reasonable or substantial possibility that death could 
ensue.  
 
2.3. THE CONATIVE COMPONENT OF DOLUS EVENTUALIS  
 
Many academics argue that the conative component is an unnecessary addition and only causes 
confusion due to the array of terminology used to define it.  However, others state that it is this 
leg of the test which reflects the true essence of dolus eventualis and which distinguishes it 
from a finding of culpa. Hoctor136 states that the ‘essence of dolus eventualis is egoism and 
selfishness, in that the actor places his ends at the same level or even higher than the ends 
protected by the law, and continues with his course of conduct in the face of the foreseen harm.’ 
Therefore, Bodenstein137 argues that ‘if every effect preconceived as possible is said to have 
been intentionally caused there would be no distinction between intention and conscious 
culpa.’ It would, thus, be dangerous and lead to unjust results if foresight only was the 
determinant of fault, as the degree of fault is not always clearcut. It is for this reason that 
Snyman138 argues that intention cannot consist merely in knowledge or appreciation of the 
existence of some fact. As Van der Merwe139 points out, dolus eventualis is a subjective inquiry 
and therefore the problem cannot be solved with reference only to the possibility of death 
foreseen, even if real, because this does not provide conclusive proof regarding his state of 
mind. Hoctor140 states that ‘the critical consideration for the purposes of criminal liability for 
harm caused to others is the accused’s mental state in respect of such harm to others.’ 
Therefore, these academics argue that by dispensing with the conative component the 
accused’s state of mind would be disregarded.  
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Morkel141 argues that: 
 
‘The proposition that when dolus eventualis is determined merely in terms of relevant foresight, 
it is not possible to distinguish it from conscious negligence is often sketched in terms of the 
example of the reckless driver. The argument proceeds as follows: the person who drives at an 
excessive speed knowing full well that, due to his tempo, a fatal accident might occur, but 
trusting that, thanks, to his own driving skills he will succeed in avoiding an accident, should 
such accident occur, by convicted of (intentional) murder or, as the case may be for attempted 
murder. A conviction of “intentional murder” in terms of the above facts is harsh and 
inappropriate; a conviction of “negligent culpable homicide” better satisfies the 
“Rechtsgefuhl” (feeling for or idea of justice).’ 
 
It is, thus, argued that it is not the degree of foresight which is the determinant of whether dolus 
or culpa exists, but how the accused reacts to foreseeing the possibility of death. In terms of 
this line of reasoning, dolus eventualis will be present where the accused, accepting that death 
may result from his conduct, willingly decides to take a chance that it will not follow. However, 
where the accused unreasonably decides that death will not ensue he will be guilty of culpable 
homicide, based on conscious negligence. Jansen JA in S v Ngubane142 held that ‘the 
distinguishing feature’ of dolus eventualis is the ‘volitional component’ and that provided that 
this component is present, it makes no difference whether the accused foresaw the possibility 
‘as strong or faint, probable or improbable.’ 
 
However, some academics believe that the Appellate Division ‘took a wrong turn with S v 
Ngubane’143 in that it has introduced ‘unnecessary confusion into the requirements for dolus 
eventualis.’144 One of the causes of this confusion lies in the fact that the courts have variously 
described its content. Academic opinion, however, mostly favours the view that dolus 
eventualis requires that the accused should have ‘reconciled himself to the consequences’ and 
therefore ‘accepts the consequences into the bargain.’145 It has been argued, nevertheless, that 
the conative component adds no value to the test for dolus eventualis and should be abandoned 
in favour of the requirement that ‘subjective foresight must have existed contemporaneously 
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with the unlawful conduct.’146 According to this view, dolus eventualis should be established 
only by subjective foresight of the unlawful conduct on the part of the accused. Burchell & 
Hunt147 submit that where the accused foresaw harm as a real possibility but nevertheless 
persisted in his conduct he consciously took the risk of its happening and therefore possessed 
dolus eventualis. Paizes148 goes on to say that the conative component is therefore ‘a notion 
without utility’ and that an accused who carries on certain conduct ‘reconciles himself’ to 
nothing more and nothing less than what he foresaw at the time of carrying on such conduct. 
In this regard Whiting149 states that:  
 
‘To say that dolus eventualis involves as an additional element reconciling oneself to the 
possibility that the result will ensue or taking this possibility into the bargain is open to the 
same objection as saying that it involves as an additional element the conscious taking of the 
risk that the result will ensue. It is superfluous, because, by acting with foresight of the 
possibility that a result will ensue, one necessarily reconciles oneself to the possibility that it 
will ensue or takes this possibility into the bargain.’ 
 
Therefore, it can be argued that an accused can never come to the conclusion that harm will 
ensue where he foresaw it merely as a remote happening, and conversely, an accused cannot 
legitimately argue that he concluded that death would not ensue when its happening was 
foreseen as real, reasonable or substantial. Van Oosten150 contends that these views are 
incorrect because proceeding to act despite possessing foresight cannot automatically be taken 
as proof that the accused has intention and that somewhere between foresight and the execution 
thereof there must be a decision by the accused to accept or reject the risk of harm 
materialising.  
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2.4. GERMAN ACADEMIC OPINION  
 
In order to find possible solutions to the current theoretical obstacles surrounding dolus 
eventualis, German literature, which treats bedingter Vorsatz according to different theories, 
will be discussed. 
 
2.4.1 The Consent and Approval Theory (Einwilligungsund Billigungstheorie)  
 
The majority of German academics who support this theory state that the accused must 
‘seriously consider’ the outcome and must ‘accept the fact’ that their conduct could lead to this 
harmful outcome.151 Morkel152 points out that the overwhelming consensus of German opinion 
is that the accused must have foreseen harm ‘with a relatively high degree of likelihood.’ 
Jescheck153 submits that the accused must consider the likelihood to be ‘serious’ (ernstlich) 
while Schmidhauser154 states that the accused must have foreseen harm as ‘concretely 
possible.’ If, however, the accused is ‘confident’ (vertrauen) and has reason to believe that the 
harm will not ensue he will only be negligent and possess bewuste Fahrlassigkeit.155 Therefore, 
the prevailing opinion in Germany requires both a cognitive and conative component, namely 
knowledge and willfulness.156 Jescheck157 states that dolus eventualis is more or less defined 
as follows:  
 
‘“Bedingter Vorsatz bedeutet, dass der Tater die Verwirklichung des gesetzlichen Tatbestandes 
ernstlich fur moglich halt und sich mit ihr abfindet” (Eventual intention entails that the 
perpetrator foresees the relevant unlawful consequences of his act as a serious possibility and 
reconciles himself with such).’ 
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With regard to cases of murder, the consent and approval theory is complemented by the 
inhibition level theory (Hemmschwellentheorie) according to which the intent to kill a person 
requires the accused to overcome a high inhibition level. 158 This high inhibition level is 
considered to be overcome when the death of the victim is so likely that ‘only a fortunate 
coincidence could have averted it.’159 The example put forward is where the accused stabs the 
victim in the heart.160 Therefore, German law provides that due to the severity of the crime of 
murder and how it is treated, the death of the victim cannot be a ‘remote’ happening. This is 
because people are generally reluctant to undertake a violent act which may lead to another 
person’s death.161 
 
2.4.2 The Theory of Possibility  
 
In Germany, some academics have argued for an interpretation of dolus eventualis based not 
upon the attitude of the accused towards the foreseen harm, but upon the possibility of the harm 
that he foresaw. Proponents of this theory argue that the envisaged possibility should have 
‘halted’ the accused from acting.162 However, the principal objection to requiring foresight of 
a mere possibility is that it casts the net of liability too wide and is in need of ‘casuistic 
correction’ for conduct which cannot be called intentional.163 A common example, which is 
the subject of much debate, is the overtaking driver who is aware of the possibility that a 
vehicle might be coming the other way, but does not intend to kill himself or to become a 
murderer if he causes another person’s death.164 Badar165 provides an example which he argues 
demonstrates that wrongful convictions would ensue if only foresight was the determinant of 
dolus eventualis: 
 
‘X is driving his car on a country road. In spite of low visibility due to fog, he overtakes a truck. 
While doing so he is fully aware that his overtaking is grossly contrary to road traffic regulations 
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as well as daredevil and perilous. Despite his awareness of the risk, X seriously trusts in his conduct 
not resulting in accident. However, when overtaking he causes a serious traffic accident in which 
an oncoming motorcyclist is killed. Did X commit manslaughter?"' According to the possibility 
theory, X is seen to have possessed the intent to kill (dolus eventualis) since he has realized the 
possibility of the result's occurrence." X had seriously trusted the nonoccurrence of the result (the 
death of another person), and thus had not accepted this fatal result, he is still considered to possess 
the intent to kill (dolus eventualis) according to the possibility theory.’ 
 
However, it can be argued that this theory would not lead to unjust results because of 
dispensing with the conative component, but rather because the degree of foresight is 
unqualified. Taylor166 recognises that this theory has been abandoned by the courts.  
 
2.4.3 The Theory of Probability   
 
According to the ‘theory of probability’, dolus eventualis exists where the accused foresees the 
harm as probable while conscious negligence exists only when the accused foresees the harm 
as merely possible.’167 Grossmann and Grunhut168 state, in support of this theory, that the judge 
has before him objective facts. Using a car accident as an example, Grossman and Grunhunt169 
state that the objective facts are, inter alia, the speed at which the car was being driven, the 
number of pedestrians in the vicinity, the road conditions, and the judge only has to make a 
finding from these proven facts as to the degree of harm. The ‘theory of probability’ is, 
however, criticised because of its vagueness. The question which has been left unanswered is 
‘when does foresight reach the level of probability?’ One recommendation which has been 
made to address the problem of vagueness is to reformulate the theory so that intentional 
conduct occurs when the accused thought that death ensuing from his conduct was more 
probable than not.170 Taylor171 states that the ‘theory of probability’ is an attempt to define 
dolus eventualis based on the view that, once a certain level of foresight beyond a remote 
possibility has been reached, and a person who wanted to avoid causing harm would modify 
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his conduct accordingly or refrain from it altogether, intention has been proved. Taylor172 goes 
on to say that proceeding to act in this situation justifies an assumption about the accused’s 
guilt, which seems to be higher than in cases of foresight of the remote possibility of harm 
ensuing and allows us to dispense with the conative component of dolus eventualis. He argues 
that ‘one who foresees a possible consequence of her actions but goes ahead anyway must 
approve to some extent of that consequence, or else she would not have gone ahead.’173 
Therefore, no convincing argument has been put forward which justifies the need for a conative 
component and he validly points out that for dolus indirectus, which requires certain 
knowledge, no conative component is required.174 Therefore, why does dolus eventualis 
require a conative component? Morkel175 demonstrates how prominent German academics 
such as Schonke, Schroder, and Welzel were on the brink of accepting that dolus eventualis 
entails that the accused acts, ‘despite the knowledge that his conduct possesses those inherent 
qualities that presuppose hits culpability – i.e., we blame the accused for having acted despite 
foreseeing the relevant consequences.’ However, Jescheck176 rejected the test of probability 
because he thought that it was possible for the accused to ‘trust’ that harm will not occur despite 
the fact the he foresaw it with a high degree of probability. In response, Morkel177 correctly 
and validly states that such a mental state is impossible: 
 
‘Should the perpetrator foresee something to such a degree of probability that he has to count on 
(reckon with) its existence-i.e., that he foresees it as concretely possible, then he may hope (but not 
trust) that it will not ensue. If such a mental state were at all possible, it would be that of a totally 
unrealistic, irresponsible optimist-and would have nothing to do with real-life experience. How is 
such trust to be designated psychologically? There can be no question of a rational conviction that 
damage will not result because the hypothesis is exactly the opposite-namely, that there is a 
preponderance of probability that "damage" will result from the conduct of the accused. In other 
words, when the perpetrator realizes that when, on balance, the facts speak so loudly for an unhappy 
ending, how can he trust in a happy ending?’ 
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2.4.4 The Risk-Recognition Theory  
 
In line with community moral responsibility, Frisch developed the risk-recognition theory. His 
theory asks whether a risk existed which was known to the accused and offends the legal 
system.178 Frisch179 states that the reason we impose harsher sentences for intentional conduct 
than negligent conduct is that the intentional actor has a greater degree of control over their 
conduct, consciously disobeyed the law or at least took the risk of violating it, and has a greater 
personal responsibility for the violation than the negligent actor. Therefore, he argues that 
intention cannot be defined by reference only to knowledge that harm may occur as this is not 
in line with the reasons as to why intention is punished more harshly.180 The requirement added 
by Frisch that the conduct must offend the legal system provides a solution to cases which 
cannot reasonably be called intentional, such as the overtaking driver, and addresses the 
problem of the Russian roulette player in which the chances of firing the gun are one in five 
and he therefore believes that there will be a ‘happy ending.’   
 
2.4.5 The Indifference Theory (Gleichgültigkeit)  
 
Engisch181 proposed to re-state the conative component of dolus eventualis as Gleichgültigkeit 
which, when translated into English means ‘indifference.’ He saw the accused’s indifference 
to a possibility foreseen by him as evidence that he was prepared to act despite this knowledge 
and, thus, acted intentionally.182 This theory preserves the separation between the cognitive 
and conative components of dolus eventualis using the conative component as the 
distinguishing feature between intention and negligence. However, it could be criticised for 
the fact that where the death of the victim is not desired, the accused would be acquitted 
because it cannot be said that they are ‘indifferent’ to death.183 The accused’s wishes or hopes 
play no part in determining their criminal liability and therefore indifference will be absent 
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where they hope that death will not ensue. This contradicts the basic and founding principal of 
criminal law in which motive is irrelevant.  
 
2.5. AMERICAN ACADEMIC OPINION  
 
The American crime of ‘extreme indifference’ murder occurs under substantially the same 
circumstances as dolus eventualis in that the accused must have consciously taken a substantial 
and unjustifiable risk under circumstances manifesting ‘extreme indifference to the value of 
human life.’ However, a difference lies in that a substantial risk must have been present 
whereas under South African law foresight of a mere ‘remote’ possibility of harm occurring is 
sufficient. The different approaches and formulations to the phrase ‘extreme indifference to 
the value of human life’ will be discussed below.  
 
2.5.1 The Objective Circumstances Approach   
 
According to this approach, the accused’s subjective state of mind plays no role or is 
subjugated to the circumstances of the killing.184 Michaels185 states that: 
 
‘In New York, for example, a homicide committed recklessly becomes murder instead of 
manslaughter when, by reference to the objective circumstances of the crime alone, the jury 
finds the circumstances themselves “so uncaring, so callous, so dangerous and so inhuman” as 
to show depraved indifference to human life.’ 
 
Therefore, it is the accused’s physical conduct which distinguishes murder from manslaughter. 
Michaels186 states that this approach has many advantages, namely that it is fairly easy for the 
jury to comprehend, it has precedent, and it produces reasonable findings by the courts. 
Michaels187 argues, however, that the lack of a definition for terms such as ‘callous; or ‘brutal’ 
may ‘allow murder convictions without any proof beyond well-packaged manslaughter’ and 
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permit juries to convict ‘by instinct, or worse, prejudice.’ Pillsbury188 goes on say that the 
vagueness of ‘moralistic phrases’ such as ‘brutal’ and ‘wanton’ may lead to ‘non-moral 
decision-making’ which is based on prejudice. Furthermore, Duffy189 correctly points out that 
‘the objective standard is also inconsistent with general homicide principles, which rely on 
mental states to differentiate various grades of murder.’ Therefore, this approach would not 
find acceptance in South Africa because South African courts have adopted the psychological 
concept of culpability, in terms of which the determination of whether an accused possesses 
dolus depends solely on his subjective state of mind.190  
 
2.5.2 The Multiple Victims Approach  
 
Some states restrict ‘extreme indifference’ murder to where multiple victims have been 
threatened. The justification for this approach is that by threatening more than one person, the 
accused’s conduct must manifest ‘extreme indifference to the value of human life generally.’191 
Although this approach provides certainty in that it can easily be established whether the 
accused threatened more than one person, Michaels192 correctly points out that ‘threatening 
multiple victims is certainly not a prerequisite for acceptance, and thus is not closely correlated 
with the culpability of knowledge.’ Therefore, this approach, once again, disregards the 
accused’s subjective state of mind at the time of committing the crime, an essential requirement 
for a finding of intention. Furthermore, it has been criticised for being both over and under 
inclusive.193 King v State194 demonstrates the failings associated with this approach. In this 
case, when the accused shot the tyres of an opponent’s car, one bullet went through the 
passenger window and killed the passenger.195 The court upheld a conviction of murder 
because two people were in the car and therefore multiple victims were threatened. Michaels196 
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correctly states that ‘if King lacked acceptance, as he well may have, surely his action, though 
reprehensible, was less culpable than a knowing killing, notwithstanding the multiple 
individuals threatened.’  
 
2.5.3 The Degree of Risk Approach  
 
Some states refer only to the riskiness of the accused’s conduct, in other words, on the 
probability that the accused’s conduct would cause death. Michaels197 states that ‘it has the 
same strength of capturing many cases of acceptance while excluding others’ and that it can 
be ‘over inclusive or under inclusive where the presence or absence of the actor’s acceptance 
of killing and a particularly high degree of risk do not correlate.’ Furthermore, Duffy198 points 
out that this approach fails to cover situations that appear to reveal an extreme indifference to 
life, ‘such as a game of Russian roulette in which there is less than a 50 percent chance that a 
bullet will discharge.’ Nourse199 states that this approach becomes ‘a rationalisation for our 
judgments, not a means to them.’ Therefore, the court will come to a finding that superficially 
seems reasonable and valid, but is unrelated to the subjective state of mind of the accused. As 
Michaels200 states, ‘high probability by itself fails as a proxy for the culpability of knowledge 
because it does not expressly consider the actor’s relative attitude between his conduct and the 
harm that conduct may entail.’ The accused’s subjective state of mind is therefore disregarded.  
 
2.5.4 The Mens Rea Approach  
 
The mens rea approach to ‘extreme indifference’ murder looks at the accused’s state of mind 
and, therefore, asks the jury to ascertain the accused’s subjective attitude toward whether the 
victim lived or not.201 This approach, however, does not provide any guidance on how to 
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establish the accused’s mental state. In response to this lack of guidance Michaels202 
reformulates the test for ‘extreme indifference’ murder by stating that:   
 
‘Extreme indifference can be discovered by asking the finder of fact whether the actor would 
have committed the act had he known it would cause a death. This question goes to the very 
core of the meaning of indifference. It discovers the "abandoned and malignant heart" and 
willingness to kill that should define unintended murder. If the answer to the question is yes, 
the defendant placed virtually no value on human life and merits punishment for murder. If the 
answer is no, human life retained significant value to him, and only punishment for 
manslaughter is justified. To convince a jury that a defendant's reckless but unintentional killing 
constitutes murder instead of manslaughter, the prosecution should be required to show that 
the defendant would have committed the fatal act even had he known that a death would result.’ 
 
It can be argued that Michael’s reformulation of ‘extreme indifference’ murder parallels with 
the conative component for dolus eventualis in that it asks the accused, after it has been 
established that the accused foresaw the real, reasonable or substantial possibility of death, 
whether the accused accepted that death would result from his proposed course of conduct. 
However, it can equally be argued that the accused’s decision to proceed with his course of 
conduct after foreseeing the real, reasonable or substantial possibility of death demonstrates 
that he possessed a ‘willingness to kill’.  
 
2.5.5 ABRAHMOVSKY AND EDELSTEIN’S REFORMULATION OF ‘EXTREME 
INDIFFERENCE’ MURDER  
 
Abrahmovsky and Edelstein203 propose that in order to distinguish manslaughter from ‘extreme 
indifference’ murder that the mens rea should ‘require that the defendant consciously disregard 
a risk that is caused solely by his own conduct and / or that of his accomplices.’ Furthermore, 
they state that ‘the definition should preclude acts purposefully directed at another, thus ruling 
out intentional murder or manslaughter in the first degree.’204 Therefore, they argue that 
‘extreme indifference’ murder occurs where the accused himself created the risk of death 
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which is not directed purposefully at harming a specific individual, and provide hypothetical 
examples to demonstrate this: 
 
‘Someone who drives at a high speed on the sidewalk would create a risk of death to pedestrians 
that would not otherwise exist. A pedestrian who steps onto a public sidewalk does not 
ordinarily accept the risk of being struck by a motor vehicle. Therefore, a driver who propels 
his vehicle onto a sidewalk engages not only in risk-disregarding conduct, but in risk-creating 
conduct, and might thus be guilty of depraved indifference murder in the event that his actions 
result in death.’205 
 
2.6. CHAPTER SUMMARY  
 
This chapter discussed the differing opinions regarding the two-stage test of dolus eventualis, 
the cognitive and conative component respectively. Arguments in favour of both a qualified 
and unqualified degree of foresight were put forward as well as arguments which support the 
conative component and those which render it redundant. The various German theories on 
bedingter Vorsatz were discussed as well as the different approaches and reformulations of 
American ‘extreme indifference to the value of human life’ as contained in ‘extreme 
indifference’ murder.  Therefore, the plethora of literature on the topic and the differing 
opinions and approaches reflects that this is an area of law which needs clarification. However, 
reference cannot be made only to the literature and a discussion of the case law of South Africa, 
Germany and America will take place to ascertain the correct approach.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
205 Ibid at 492-493.  
44 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
A DISCUSSION OF SOUTH AFRICAN, GERMAN AND 
AMERICAN CASE LAW 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
South Africa’s legal system includes a doctrine of precedent in terms of which the judgments 
of higher courts become principles of established law in cases where statutory law is silent on 
the matter. Both the crimes of murder and culpable homicide are not statutorily defined and 
therefore judgments of the courts have become the most important source on the rules relating 
to these crimes. It is, thus, imperative to place emphasis on what the courts have held. In finding 
the correct approach, German and American case law will be looked at for guidance.  
 
3.2 SOUTH AFRICAN CASE LAW  
 
3.2.1 S v Beukes206 
 
The Appellate Division held that it is highly unlikely that an accused will admit to or it will be 
proved that he foresaw a remote consequence and that it needs to be established that it was 
reasonably possible that harm would ensue.207 The court went on to say that the conative 
component is of value as an additional element of dolus eventualis and will generally only be 
satisfied where the accused had acted despite possessing foresight of a reasonable possibility. 
Hoctor208 states that this judgment ‘by no means excludes foresight of a remote possibility’ by 
referring to where the court states that ‘liability for dolus eventualis will normally (his 
emphasis) only follow where the possibility is foreseen as a strong one.’ However, it can be 
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argued, using Paize’s209 line of reasoning, that the court’s use of the word ‘normally’ covers 
those ‘exceptional cases where foresight of a possibility, however remote, should be viewed 
as sufficient’ such as where the conduct has no social utility or its purpose is to expose the 
victim to death. Therefore, foresight of a remote possibility should be viewed as the exception, 
and not the norm. Paizes210 provides an example of the game of Russian roulette to define such 
an exceptional case: 
 
‘What would the position be, however, if the number of chambers contained by the revolver 
was sufficiently high to render the statistical chances of B dying as a result of this ploy slight 
or remote? What if the number was, not seven, but seventy, or seven hundred, or seven 
thousand? It is submitted that the result is not affected by inflating empirical probabilities. If A 
were to kill B in these circumstances, he would be blameworthy even if he foresees the 
possibility of B’s death as no greater than one in a thousand.’ 
 
In S v De Ruiter,211 the ‘solitary case in which Beukes has been explicitly followed in relation 
to the degree of foresight’212 the court held that the ‘reasonableness’ referred to indicates the 
basis upon which the court must draw an inference to determine whether an accused possessed 
such intent. Hoctor213 points out that ‘the court in Beukes was not instituting a doctrinal sea 
change, but merely reflecting an evidential verity.’ As held in R v Horn:214 
 
‘It is only in proving the wrongdoer’s appreciation of death as a possible result that it becomes 
relevant whether death was ‘likely’, for the more likely death was, the stronger is the inference 
that he in fact appreciated the risk to life.’ 
 
Furthermore, in Ngubane,215 Jansen JA held that ‘the likelihood in the eyes of the agent of the 
possibility eventuating must obviously have a bearing on the question whether he did consent 
to that possibility.’ From the abovementioned dicta, the argument in favour of a qualified 
degree of foresight is, in fact, strengthened. Where the accused foresees the possibility of his 
conduct causing harm as real or substantial, but nevertheless carries on engaging in such 
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conduct, it can more easily be inferred that he accepted, and therefore intended, the 
consequences of his actions. 
 
3.2.2 S v Du Preez216 
 
This case provides an example of conscious negligence. The accused, whilst on a picnic with 
his wife and son, fired four warning shots diagonally in front of two men who were insulting 
towards his wife. According to the accused, he then noticed that ‘there were rocks in the road’ 
and realised that a bullet might ricochet and injure one of the men.217 As a result, he thereafter 
fired over the men, aiming, he said ‘between two and three feet above their heads.’218 One of 
the shots hit one of the men in the head and caused his death. The accused testified that he 
regarded himself as a ‘fairly good shot’.219 He stated that he was ‘so confident that I could not 
have hit the deceased’ that he thought that the deceased's fall was a ruse.220 The court a quo 
found the appellant guilty of murder on the basis that he subjectively foresaw the possibility 
that his conduct could result in the deceased’s death and that he was reckless as to whether 
death ensued or not. On appeal, the court held that although the appellant ‘allowed a lamentably 
small margin of safety’ he was confident that he would not strike either of the two men.221 The 
court went on to state: 
 
‘Deplorable though appellant's conduct was, it does not, in the light of all the evidence, in my 
view establish that [the] appellant subjectively foresaw the possibility of injury or death. That 
appellant ought to have foreseen such a possibility is, in my opinion, beyond all question; but, 
on a conspectus of all the facts of the case as found by the trial court, the State failed, in my 
view, to prove that, notwithstanding his denials, the appellant must have foreseen - and, 
therefore, did foresee - the possibility of injury or death ensuing from his actions.’222 
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Based on the above, the court replaced the appellant’s conviction of murder with that of 
culpable homicide. However, as stated above, the court came to the conclusion that the accused 
did not possess dolus eventualis because he did not foresee that he would shoot the deceased. 
Therefore, it can be argued that the conative component is redundant and because of the 
accused’s misplaced confidence, he did not possess foresight, which was the end of the test. 
Therefore, his decision to proceed with his course of conduct could not amount to dolus 
eventualis, but at the least is conscious negligence. However, had the court found that he had 
foresight of a real, reasonable or substantial possibility, the inference would be that he 
‘accepted the possibility into the bargain.’ Furthermore, it must be pointed out that discharging 
a firearm in the direction of moving individuals poses the real, reasonable or substantial 
possibility of causing death, and furthermore, it is conduct without social utility and which 
offends the legal system.   
 
3.2.3 S v Maritz223 
 
A murder suspect had been tied by a rope to a police vehicle and ordered to run in front of it 
by the appellant. However, part of the rope got caught under a wheel of the vehicle, which 
caused the deceased to be pulled back and dragged under the vehicle’s wheels. The Appellate 
Division held that dolus was lacking because the accused had not considered the risk of death, 
but confirmed a conviction of culpable homicide because he ought to have done so. The court 
held that an accused does not consent to a foreseen risk where he believes that he can prevent 
its occurrence.224 Boister 225 however points out that the court’s conclusion that the accused 
had not accepted that death would ensue because he believed that he could avoid it could rather 
be argued on the basis that the accused did not foresee death as a real or substantial possibility. 
Therefore, Burchell226 argues that this decision reveals the merit of dispensing with the 
conative component and favouring the distinction between foresight of a real and remote 
possibility. 
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3.2.4 S v Dlamini227 
 
In this case, the appellants had been charged with murdering the deceased, the cause of death 
being suffocation. The Supreme Court of Appeal held that: 
 
‘in the absence of direct admissions, the state of mind of a perpetrator at the time of a crime is 
a question of inference drawn from all the material proven facts both for and against the 
conclusion of guilt. The facts must be considered holistically to determine whether they permit 
an inference to be drawn beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused actually foresaw the 
reasonable possibility that his victim could die from the assault but, nevertheless proceeded 
with it reckless of that outcome.’228 
 
The above dicta demonstrates that the accused’s state of mind is ascertained from the degree 
of foresight that they possessed and that the conative component consists merely of having 
‘proceeded’ with the proposed course of conduct, undeterred by the ‘reasonable possibility’ 
that the victim may die from such conduct. The court went on to state that:  
 
‘the common experience of mankind is that shutting off the power to breathe leads within a 
short time to death. Just as it does not avail an assailant who points a loaded firearm at his 
victim's heart and pulls the trigger to deny an intention to kill without offering an acceptable 
explanation for such denial, so credibility is stretched beyond breaking point by one who forces 
a gag into his victim's throat and denies that he foresaw the reasonable possibility (own 
emphasis) of death but does not explain why such blindness possessed him.’229 
 
Therefore, the court makes the valid point that once it is inferred that the accused subjectively 
foresaw the real, reasonable or substantial possibility of death, ‘credibility is stretched beyond 
breaking point’ where that accused denies that they accepted that death would ensue. It is 
illogical for an accused to have foreseen the real, reasonable or substantial possibility of death 
without having accepted that death could result. Therefore, by requiring a qualified degree of 
foresight, the conative component is fulfilled with the accused proceeding with the conduct 
that is foreseen to cause death. The court therefore held that there was evidence of foresight of 
a reasonable possibility of death and factual proof that despite such foresight he had taken the 
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necessary steps to bring the expectation to reality. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal, 
upholding the appellants’ convictions of murder. Burchell230 states that ‘this approach 
(combined with regarding anything short of this limitation as constituting at the most conscious 
negligence) is to be preferred to the Ngubane approach of extending dolus eventualis in 
principle to foresight of a ‘remote’ possibility.’ 
 
 
3.2.5 S v Makgatho231 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal held that for dolus eventualis to be present in respect of a 
consequence ‘it must be shown that a real - as opposed to a remote - possibility of that 
consequence resulting was foreseen.’232 The court referred approvingly to the case of S v Van 
Wyk233 in which Ackermann AJA held that ‘the subjective foresight required for dolus 
eventualis is the subjective appreciation that there is a reasonable possibility that the proscribed 
consequence will ensue.’ Paizes234 states the court’s decision is ‘a significant acceptance of 
what we submit to be the correct position’ and that ‘any doubt that foresight of a remote 
possibility might suffice has now been eliminated.’ 
 
3.2.6 S v Qeqe235 
 
The accused, whilst driving a vehicle with the objective of evading police officers who were 
pursuing them in order to effect an arrest, executed a dangerous manoeuvre across sidewalks 
and, in doing so, killed three children. The court, after considering the evidence, held:  
 
‘The accused must have known in the subjective sense that he was executing a highly perilous 
manoeuvre, perilous not only to himself and his passengers, but also to pedestrians in the 
vicinity. He must also have known, again in the subjective sense, that the manoeuvre might not 
succeed and that somebody might be struck by the vehicle.’236 
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The possibility of striking the children was not a remote, but a real possibility, evident in the 
fact that the court refers to the accused’s conduct as a ‘highly perilous manoeuvre’237 and 
‘while attempting this manoeuvre, he (the accused) was conscious of the presence of people 
on the respective sidewalks.’238 The court therefore held that the accused carried out his 
conduct with the knowledge that those in the vicinity would fall victim to his conduct and 
therefore can be said to have ‘consented’ or ‘reconciled himself’ to the deaths of the three 
children. The court went on to state that ‘the accused was in possession and control of 
an instrument potentially no less lethal than a firearm. He used it with fatal effect.’239 The court 
therefore convicted the accused of murder. This decision states that because the accused 
foresaw the real possibility of death ensuing he, as a result, consented to the death and therefore 
possessed dolus eventualis.  
 
3.2.7 S v Humphreys240 
 
The accused, who was found guilty of murder on the basis of dolus eventualis by the court a 
quo, was driving a minibus carrying fourteen schoolchildren when he collided with a train 
resulting in the death of ten children and injuries to four passengers and himself. On appeal, 
the court held that the test for dolus eventualis is two-fold, namely: 
 
‘(a)  Did the appellant subjectively foresee the possibility of the death of his passengers 
ensuing from his conduct; and 
(b)    Did he reconcile himself with that possibility?’241 
 
Based on the evidence, the court agreed that the element of subjective foresight had been 
established because the accused had entered a boom-controlled level crossing with the booms 
down and the warning signals flashing. The court held, in relation to the cognitive component: 
 
‘One should also avoid the flawed process of deductive reasoning that, because the appellant 
should have foreseen the consequences, it can be concluded that he did. That would conflate 
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the different tests for dolus and negligence. On the other hand, like any other fact, subjective 
foresight can be proved by inference. Moreover, common sense dictates that the process of 
inferential reasoning may start out from the premise that, in accordance with common human 
experience, the possibility of the consequences that ensued would have been obvious to any 
person of normal intelligence. The next logical step would then be to ask whether, in the light 
of all the facts and circumstances of this case, there is any reason to think that the appellant 
would not have shared this foresight, derived from common human experience, with other 
members of the general population.’242 
 
Therefore, the court reasoned that every person of normal intelligence would recognise that 
disregarding the warning signals of an approaching train, and avoiding the boom aimed at 
stopping vehicles from entering a railway crossing by reason of the approaching train, may 
result in an accident with that train.243 The natural consequence of such a recognition is the 
foresight on the part of ‘every right-minded person’, that disregarding these safety measures 
creates the possibility that the foreseen harm may ensue.244 Van der Merwe245 correctly states 
that Brand JA’s references to ‘any person of normal intelligence’ and ‘every right-minded 
person’, instead of a ‘reasonable’ person indicates that these dicta help to differentiate between 
dolus eventualis and conscious negligence by avoiding the application of an objective standard 
to the cognitive component of dolus eventualis. However, the court found that possession of 
foresight alone, whether slight or real, was not sufficient to find the accused guilty of murder, 
but that the determination of whether the accused is guilty of murder or culpable homicide 
rests on the conative component of dolus eventualis. The court went on to explain the 
significance of the conative component by referring to Ngubane246 in which it was held that 
‘the distinguishing feature of dolus eventualis is the volitional component.’ The court 
proceeded to state that the correct question to be asked under the conative component is: 
 
‘Whether the appellant took the consequences that he foresaw into the bargain; whether it can 
be inferred that it was immaterial to him whether these consequences would flow from his 
actions. Conversely stated, the principle is that if it can reasonably be inferred that the appellant 
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may have thought that the possible collision he subjectively foresaw would not actually occur, 
the second element of dolus eventualis would not have been established.’247 
 
Therefore, the court, in applying the conative component, found that the court a quo had 
incorrectly found that the appellant ‘appreciating the possibility of the consequences 
nonetheless proceeded with his conduct, reckless as to these consequences.’248 The court 
concluded that the appellant in the case foresaw the possibility of a collision occurring, but ‘he 
took a risk which he thought would not materialise.’249 The court held that the fact that the 
appellant had on previous occasions successfully performed this manoeuvre probably led him 
to the belief that he could repeat it without harm.250 This belief was a grievous error of 
judgment and, thus, constituted gross negligence on the appellant's part. The court, further, 
took the view that where the accused did not foresee himself being harmed by his reckless 
driving, then he cannot be said to have done so with regard to the deaths of others. The SCA 
went on to replace the court a quo’s finding of murder with a conviction of culpable homicide 
as ‘it cannot be suggested that any reasonable driver would behave as the appellant did.’251 
Van der Merwe252 states that the Humphreys judgment ‘highlights that dolus is always 
determined with reference to the accused’s actual state of mind.’ However, Burchell253 argues 
that the court’s reasoning on the volitional aspect of dolus eventualis neglects a crucial aspect 
of the cognitive component, namely, did the accused foresee death as a real or substantial 
possibility or not? Burchell254 goes on to state that the fact that the accused had successfully 
executed such a manoeuvre in the past cannot override the inference that he foresaw that there 
was a substantial or real possibility of failure this time and points out: 
 
‘Surely a person who agrees to race his car at breakneck speed against a vehicle driven by 
another on a public road foresees the real possibility of death resulting to someone, including 
himself. This conclusion is in no way diminished by the fact that he and others may have 
managed to escape unscathed from such races in the past or that he may have an over-optimistic 
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impression of his driving skill. If a fatal accident does result from this conduct, are the two 
drivers not both guilty of murder by means of dolus eventualis?’ 
 
3.2.8 S v Ndlanzi255 
 
The accused, whilst driving a taxi, drove onto the pavement, in the city centre, colliding with 
a newspaper stall and knocking over the deceased who was walking on the pavement. The 
court a quo convicted the accused of murder on the basis of dolus eventualis. The accused 
admitted that it was peak hour traffic and that there were many pedestrians, however, he 
maintained that the pedestrians walking on the pavement were at a distance moving in the 
opposite direction.256 He testified that he never saw the deceased because he ‘was looking back 
and sideways’.257 On appeal, the court, applying the conative component as enunciated in 
Humphreys, held that: 
 
‘Any person with a modicum of intelligence would have appreciated that driving a motor 
vehicle onto the pavement in the prevailing circumstances of this case raised the possibility 
that a collision with a pedestrian would occur with fatal consequences. Any right-minded 
person would have foreseen the possibility of the death of a pedestrian. On the evidence, there 
is no basis for concluding that the appellant did not possess the requisite subjective intent in 
accordance with this standard.’258 
 
Therefore, it was found that the appellant had subjective foresight of the possibility of death to 
a pedestrian. However, the court held that this was not the end of the test and that ‘the second 
element of dolus eventualis requires proof.’259 The court concluded that, on the evidence, the 
appellant believed that he would be able to avoid an accident with the pedestrians and therefore 
the court held that ‘it cannot be inferred that it was immaterial to the appellant whether he 
collided with a pedestrian on the pavement.’260 The court, further, went on to state that it could 
also reasonably be inferred that the appellant may have thought that an accident with a 
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pedestrian, which he subjectively foresaw, would not actually ensue.261 In other words, he 
‘took a risk which he thought would not materialise’ and accordingly could not be found guilty 
of murder on dolus eventualis.262 Therefore, the court replaced the appellant’s conviction of 
murder with one of culpable homicide holding that ‘it is clear from the conduct of the appellant 
that he did not act like a reasonable driver.’263 However, by taking a ‘risk which he though 
would not materialise’ can equally be stated that he did not foresee a collision occurring and 
therefore did not the possess the requisite foresight for dolus eventualis.  
 
3.3 GERMAN CASE LAW  
 
German case law will be consulted because the German bedingter Vorsatz parallels the South 
African dolus eventualis. Therefore, it will be instructive to discuss how German courts come 
to their findings.  
 
3.3.1 Leather Strap Case264  
 
The accused in this case planned to knock the deceased unconscious, but the original method 
chosen to achieve this outcome failed and they resorted to choking the deceased with a leather 
strap until he could not move anymore. Throughout the commission of the crime, they wished 
only to render him unconscious, not to kill him. However, they did realise that there existed a 
possibility that the deceased could be strangled to death. The court held that dolus eventualis 
entails a two-stage test, namely that the accused foresees the harmful consequence as possible 
and that he approves of it. The court made it clear that the conative component can be present 
even where the accused honestly claims that he preferred the deceased’s survival to their 
death.265 It is sufficient that in order to achieve his goal, which was to immobilise the deceased 
in order to rob him, the accused accepted the harmful consequence because it was the necessary 
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means to achieve his end.266 Therefore, the court convicted the accused of murder because they 
‘approved’ of the deceased’s death ‘as a matter of law’ even though they disliked the 
outcome.267 However, it can be said that once the accused ‘realised’ that the victim could die 
from suffocation he approved of the resulting death when he made the decision to continue 
with the act of choking of the deceased.  
 
3.3.2 Gas Leak Case268 
 
The court held that the mere hope which an accused may possess that the victim would remain 
unharmed and notice the gas leak, which the accused had intentionally caused in the home in 
which the victim lived, was insufficient to negate intention.269 Therefore, the fact that the 
accused hoped that the harmful consequence would not materialise has no bearing on the 
determination of criminal liability. As Bockelmann270 states, ‘it is trust, rather than hope, in a 
happy ending that determines the state of the mind of the person who believes that he has the 
matter in hand and that he can master the encountered danger without the help of luck.’ 
Therefore, this case illustrates that where the accused honestly believes or possesses an earnest 
reliance, rather than the hope, that the harmful consequence will not ensue, then the accused 
will be guilty of culpable homicide on the basis of conscious negligence. Taylor271 states in 
this regard that: 
 
‘It may well be that the accused in the Gas Leak Case could have demonstrated an earnest 
reliance by alerting someone to the danger he had created, but that would involve modifying 
his act by making the outcome of death objectively less probable, and accordingly does not 
really help us to identify a mental state which, without any modification of the facts, would 
count as earnest reliance rather than vague hope.’ 
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3.3.3 Doner Shop Case272 
 
The Federal Supreme Court of Germany favoured a two-stage test for dolus eventualis. The 
accused in this case, wishing to force Turkish people out of Germany, set their doner kebab 
shop on fire.273 In doing so, the accused injured K, who was in the shop whilst the fire was 
initiated. Due to the fact that the accused knew of K’s presence he was charged with attempted 
murder. The question before the court was whether the accused possessed the requisite 
intention to kill.274 The court held that intention to kill would be present where the accused 
‘considered the occurrence of the proscribed result to be a not entirely distant possibility and, 
further, if he approved of it or reconciled himself to it for the sake of attaining his desired 
goal.’275 If, however, the accused ‘had earnestly, and not merely in a vague way, relied on the 
non-occurrence of a fatal result’276 he lacked the necessary intention. The court therefore had 
to assess whether the accused reconciled himself to the possible death of K, irrespective of the 
fact that he foresaw the possibility of death ensuing.  
 
However, Taylor277 validly argues that the courts are forced to attribute a fictional disposition 
to the accused as appears to have been in the Doner Shop Case and that German courts ‘have 
never been able to give a convincing account of what it means to act in earnest reliance as 
distinct from a pious hope.’ Therefore, he contends that the ‘superfluity’ of the conative 
component once a certain degree of foresight is reached is the reason why ‘the dispositional 
criterion appears, on analysis, to be devoid of content.’278 Dubber and Hörnle279 state that 
‘German courts are often forced to infer volition from cognition, by determining whether the 
defendant’s acceptance of the possible occurrence of harm may be inferred based on (his or 
her awareness) of the gravity of the risk.’ Therefore, they contend foresight of a substantial 
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risk will be taken as proof of the conative component, the result being that the conative 
component ‘is in danger of being collapsed into the cognitive aspect.’280 
  
3.4 AMERICAN CASE LAW  
 
American case law on ‘extreme indifference’ murder, which has been likened to the German 
bedinger Vorstaz and is therefore similar to the South African dolus eventualis, will be briefly 
consulted. Only case law from the state of New York has been looked at because it is the focus 
of scholarly literature.   
 
3.4.1 People v Sanchez281 
 
The accused got into a fight with his friend, Timothy Range, during a birthday party, following 
which the accused ‘abruptly turn[ed] around, fire[d] a gun pointed at Range’s chest and 
fle[d].’282 The accused was charged and convicted of ‘extreme indifference’ murder.  On 
appeal, the majority held that despite that fact that the accused shot the deceased at point-blank 
range, the attack might have been ‘an instantaneous, impulsive shooting – perhaps to disable 
or frighten, rather than to kill him.’283 The court went on to hold that ‘shooting into the victim’s 
torso at point-blank range presented such a transcendent risk of causing his death that it readily 
meets the level of manifested depravity needed to establish murder.’284 The court attempted to 
clarify the distinction between ‘extreme indifference’ murder and manslaughter by stating that 
‘in a depraved mind murder the actor’s conduct must present a grave risk of death whereas in 
manslaughter it presents the lesser substantial risk of death.’285 This accords with the degree 
of risk approach, however, it can be argued that this line of reasoning should be applied to the 
degree of foresight which is required for dolus eventualis and conscious negligence 
respectively. A higher degree of foresight, namely, a real, reasonable or substantial risk of 
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death should be present for murder, whereas foresight of a remote possibility of death should 
be indicative of culpable homicide.   
 
3.4.2 People v Suarez286  
 
The New York Court of Appeals held, with regard to the distinction between reckless 
manslaughter and ‘extreme indifference’ murder, that: 
 
‘The critical statutory language that separates second-degree manslaughter from depraved 
indifference murder is the defendant’s underlying depraved indifference. “[C]ircumstances 
evincing a depraved indifference to human life” are not established by recklessness coupled 
only with actions that carry even an inevitable risk of death. We therefore make clear that 
depraved indifference is best understood as an utter disregard for the value of human life – a 
willingness to act not because one intends harm, but because one simply doesn’t care whether 
grievous harm results or not.’287 
 
It is seen how the law in New York changed from reference only to the objective risk of death 
to looking at the accused’s subjective state of mind i.e. ‘one simply does not care’ whether 
death results or not. It can be contended that one does not care whether death results or not 
when they act with the subjective knowledge that their conduct carries the real, reasonable or 
substantial possibility of causing death.  
 
3.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY  
 
This chapter discussed selected case law from South Africa, Germany and America and in 
doing so demonstrated the different approaches taken by the different jurisdictions. It also 
provided the support and criticisms which have been leveled against these decisions. The 
following chapter will summarise the findings of this dissertation and provide 
recommendations, based on these findings, on how to properly define dolus eventualis in the 
context of murder.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The question posed in chapter one asked ‘which consequences foreseen as possible should be 
considered to have been intended?’288 In order to answer this question it needs to be determined 
whether the current two-stage test for dolus eventualis adequately defines the situation in which 
a risk-taking accused is found to possess dolus, and in doing so distinguishes itself from culpa. 
Based on the discussion of literature and case law in chapters two and three, this chapter will 
determine the sufficiency of dolus eventualis by summarising and analysing the findings of the 
preceding discussion, as well as providing recommendations which will help demarcate dolus 
eventualis from culpa.  
 
4.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS  
 
The summary below comprises the main findings from the research conducted in the 
dissertation.   
 
4.2.1 The Cognitive and Conative Component of Dolus Eventualis in South Africa 
 
It is currently settled law that the degree of foresight required is merely the possibility of harm 
occurring. However, it is not settled amongst academics whether the most remote and unlikely 
possibility of death, if foreseen, must be regarded as intention. It has been pointed out that the 
courts only find dolus eventualis to be present when the accused foresaw death as a real, 
reasonable or substantial possibility and, therefore, they implicitly reject that a murder 
conviction will ensue where the accused foresaw the possibility of death ‘on the footing that 
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anything is possible.’289 Therefore, it is argued in the literature that the foresight required is of 
a real, reasonable or substantial possibility in order to confine intention ‘to a state of mind that 
can properly be regarded as such and keep the dividing line between intention and negligence 
clearcut.’290 By extending the degree of foresight to that of a chance occurrence, wrongful 
convictions could ensue because an accused cannot foresee a possibility if he thinks of it but 
considers it to be remote.291 It is therefore the degree of foresight which is the determinant of 
whether the accused possessed dolus or culpa. It has been proposed that foresight of a remote 
possibility will only suffice when the accused’s conduct has no social utility and where it was 
the accused’s purpose to expose the victim to death. Furthermore, it has been argued that when 
determining whether the accused possessed dolus eventualis, the court must ascertain whether 
the risk taken was of a general statistical nature or whether it was concrete. However, in the 
literature, many academics argue that requiring foresight of a real, reasonable or substantial 
possibility limits the application of dolus eventualis and that the position to be favoured is that 
of an unqualified degree of foresight. They argue that, in response to the fears that an 
unqualified degree of foresight will ‘open the floodgates of liability for murder’,292 there are 
in fact safeguards in place: that it is more difficult to infer foresight where the consequence 
was improbable; and remoteness of the possibility will reduce the punishment. 
 
It is settled law that the conative component is recognised as part of the test for dolus 
eventualis. Although the courts have variously described its content, the majority of academics 
hold that the conative component is satisfied when the accused has ‘reconciled himself to the 
consequences’293 and ‘accepts the consequences into the bargain.’294 The proponents of this 
component state that it is conative component of dolus eventualis which distinguishes it from 
culpa. They argue that to dispense with it would lead to unjust results because foresight alone 
does not provide conclusive proof regarding the accused’s state of mind. However, some 
academics argue that it is redundant and only causes confusion. Rather, the test for dolus 
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eventualis should require only that the accused subjectively foresaw the possibility of death 
ensuing as real, reasonable or substantial. They submit that where the accused persisted with 
his course of conduct despite possessing this level of foresight he consciously took the risk of 
its happening and therefore reconciled himself to the possibility that it will ensue. It is therefore 
argued that the conative component is rendered redundant because an accused reconciles 
himself to nothing more and nothing less than what he subjectively foresaw. In response to the 
criticisms that dispensing with the conative component disregards the accused’s state of mind, 
it is contended that ‘dolus eventualis does concern the accused’s state of mind, but only in the 
cognitive sense’295 and therefore subjective foresight alone is sufficient to ascertain the 
accused’s state of mind. 
 
In S v Beukes,296 S v Dlamini,297 and S v Makgatho,298 the Supreme Court of Appeal favoured 
an unqualified degree of foresight which shows that authority does exist for the position.  
However, in S v Du Preez,299 S v Maritz,300 S v Humphreys,301 and S v Ndlanzi,302 the courts 
favoured an unqualified degree of foresight and held that the accused lacked dolus eventualis 
because he ‘believed’ or was ‘confident’ that death would not ensue. However, Boister303  
submits that this belief or confidence could rather be argued on the basis that the accused did 
not foresee death as a real or substantial possibility. In S v Dlamini,304 the Supreme Court of 
Appeal makes the point that once it is inferred that the accused subjectively foresaw the real, 
reasonable or substantial possibility of death, ‘credibility is stretched beyond breaking point’ 
where that accused denies that they accepted that death would ensue. Furthermore, the court 
in S v Qeqe,305 although still referring to the conative component, implicitly states that because 
the accused foresaw death as a real possibility, he can, as a logical inference, be said to have 
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reconciled himself to the death. The court’s findings are, in reality, solely based on the degree 
of foresight possessed by the accused at the time of committing the crime and therefore the 
accused’s foresight, which reflects his state of mind, indicates a willingness to kill. The 
conative component consists merely of the accused having proceeded to carry out the risky 
conduct despite possessing foresight of something more than the merely ‘possible’. 
  
4.2.2 Bedingter Vorsatz and bewuste Fahrlassigkeit in Germany  
 
Bedingter Vorsatz, the German equivalent of dolus eventualis, involves two components, 
namely, that the accused foresaw harm as a serious possibility and that he reconciled himself 
with it.  This accords with the consent and approval theory which requires both knowledge and 
willfulness. With cases of murder, the consent and approval theory is complemented by the 
inhibition level theory in terms of which death must be so likely that ‘only a fortunate 
coincidence could have averted it.’306 However, some academics in the literature argue that 
dolus eventualis is present when the accused foresaw the possibility of harm, as contained in 
the theory of possibility. This theory is criticised by some for being over inclusive in that it 
includes conduct which cannot reasonably be called intentional. Another theory which 
supports the view that dolus eventualis consists only of subjective foresight is the theory of 
probability in terms of which the accused will guilty of murder when he foresaw the harm as 
probable and of culpable homicide when he foresaw the harm as less than probable. However, 
the theory of probability has been criticised in the literature as being too vague, but some argue 
that, once a certain level of foresight has been reached, the person who wanted to avoid harm 
would have adjusted his action. It has been pointed out that dolus indirectus, which only differs 
from dolus eventualis in the degree of foresight, does not require a conative component, but 
that the accused proceeds with his actions, thereby evincing approval of the consequences. The 
Risk-Recognition Theory was also developed in terms of which the court must ask whether a 
risk existed which was known to the accused and offends the legal system. The requirement 
that the conduct must offend the legal system provides a solution to cases which cannot be 
called intentional, such as the overtaking driver, and equally addresses the problem of the 
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Russian roulette player, in which the probability of death may not be high, but the conduct is 
reprehensible and has no social utility. The last approach discussed was the Indifference 
Theory, which proposes that the conative component should mean that the accused was 
indifferent to the unlawful consequence materialising. However, the Indifference Theory has 
been criticised in the literature for including the accused’s wishes or hopes, as the person who 
hopes or wishes that harm will not ensue cannot be indifferent.  
 
In the Leather Strap,307 Gas Leak308 and Doner Shop cases,309 a two-stage test for dolus 
eventualis is favoured and the courts hold that dolus eventualis is distinguished from conscious 
negligence in the conative component. They hold that the accused must possess ‘an earnest 
reliance’ that death will not ensue, not merely a ‘pious hope’. However, Taylor310 and Dubber 
and Hörnle311 point out that the courts have never given content to the terms ‘earnest reliance’ 
and ‘pious hope’ evident in the abovementioned cases because they infer the accused’s state 
of mind from the accused’s foresight of the consequences.  
 
4.2.3 ‘Extreme Indifference’ Murder in America  
 
In terms of Section 210.2 (1) (b) of the Model Penal Code, ‘extreme indifference’ murder 
occurs when the accused takes a substantial and unjustifiable risk under circumstances 
manifesting ‘extreme indifference to the value of human life.’ However, different states have 
taken different approaches to the phrase ‘extreme indifference to the value of human life.’ The 
Objective Circumstances approach focuses on the circumstances of the crime alone which are 
‘uncaring’, ‘callous’, ‘dangerous’ and ‘inhuman’.312 However, it has been argued in the 
literature that one must avoid moralistic phrases such as, inter alia, ‘callous’ and ‘brutal’ 
because it can lead to prejudicial decision-making. Furthermore, an objective standard neglects 
the accused’s state of mind. Some states only find ‘extreme indifference’ murder where the 
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accused threatened more than one person’s life, referred to as the Multiple Victims approach. 
However, although it provides certainty, it is argued that threatening multiple victims is not a 
prerequisite for acceptance. Therefore, it is both over and under inclusive. The Degree of Risk 
approach is applied by some states in terms of which the court refers only to the probability 
that the accused’s conduct would result in death. However, it is argued in the literature that the 
objectivity of this approach neglects the accused’s mental state and fails to cover situations 
that appear to revel an extreme indifference to human life such as a game of Russian roulette. 
The Mens Rea approach is used by some states and asks the jury to ascertain the accused’s 
subjective attitude toward whether the victim lived or not. However, it is pointed out that this 
approach does not provide any guidance on establishing the accused’s mental state. In 
response, it has been proposed that the test for ‘extreme indifference’ be reformulated by 
stating that the court must ask whether the accused would have committed the act had he known 
it would cause death. If answered in the affirmative, then the accused has demonstrated a 
willingness to kill. Abrahmovsky and Edelstein313 propose that ‘extreme indifference’ murder 
should only take place where the accused created a risk of death that did not exist before his 
conduct and which is not directed at any one particular individual.  
 
New York’s case law was consulted and it was found that a high degree of risk must be present. 
In People v Suarez,314 the New York Court of Appeals added to the test set out in People v 
Sanchez315 and held that ‘extreme indifference to the value of human life’ is taken to mean that 
the accused did not care whether death ensued or not.  
 
4.3 RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
The findings of the research demonstrate that the degree of foresight contained in the cognitive 
component should be qualified. In other words, the accused must have foreseen death as a real, 
reasonable or substantial possibility and foresight of anything less will constitute culpable 
homicide. Due to the high degree of stigma associated with a conviction for murder, the 
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principles of fundamental justice require a level of mens rea which reflects the nature of 
murder.316 Therefore, requiring a remote degree of foresight for dolus eventualis does not 
sufficiently reflect a level of mens rea that is sufficient for murder and the stigma attached. 
This is why both Germany and America require that there be a high degree of risk for a murder 
conviction. Furthermore, the courts, in practice, do not find dolus eventualis to be present 
where the foresight of harm occurring was remote, as a person of normal intelligence cannot 
accept, and therefore intend, that death will ensue where they foresaw it as a remote happening. 
Consequently, it appears that the conative component is rendered redundant and should be 
dispensed with. Not only have the courts never delved into explaining the content of the 
conative component, thereby leaving it a confusing concept, but they also infer this component 
from cognition by ascertaining whether the accused’s acceptance of death may be inferred 
based on his foresight of the probable result of death. Therefore, foresight of a probable risk 
will be taken as proof of the conative component, the result being, as Dubber and Hörnle317 
state, that the conative component is ‘collapsed’ into the cognitive component. Furthermore, 
Taylor318 validly points out that for dolus indirectus, which requires only the certain foresight 
of death, no conative component is required. When foresight is of a real, reasonable or 
substantial possibility, there exists no reason why dolus eventualis should contain a conative 
component merely because there is a reduction in the foresight of the possibility of death. 
Therefore, the arguments put forward, that foresight alone does not reflect intention and 
neglects the accused’s state of mind, have no validity. It is for this reason that Loubser and 
Rabie319 state that ‘dolus eventualis does concern the accused’s state of mind, but only in a 
cognitive sense, in that it requires a conclusion as to whether a harmful result may actually 
occur in the circumstances.’ This conclusion is based on the degree of foresight possessed by 
the accused at the time of committing the crime because an accused cannot conclude that a 
harmful result will ensue when he foresaw it as a remote happening and the courts infer 
accordingly.  
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However, there are cases which cannot reasonably be called cases of intentional acting, such 
as the Russian roulette player, in which the chance of firing the gun is not probable and the 
accused therefore believes that there will be a ‘happy ending’.  It is submitted that the Risk-
Recognition theory in which the accused’s conduct must offend the legal system provides a 
solution to the abovementioned cases and should therefore be welcomed. This accords with 
the views that foresight of a remote possibility will suffice when the conduct involved has no 
social utility, but ‘it is the accused’s purpose to expose the victim to the risk of death.’ 320 
Likewise, the slightest social utility of the conduct will introduce an inquiry into the degree of 
probability of harm and a balancing of this hazard against its social utility.’321 This can also be 
said to be in line with Abrahmovsky and Edelstein’s reformulation of ‘extreme indifference’ 
murder in which the accused himself created the risk of death because, for example, a car 
accident is an everyday risk, but, when an accused decides to drive on a public sidewalk, it is 
a risk which would not have been there absent the accused’s conduct.  
 
4.4. CONCLUSION   
 
In conclusion, the current test for dolus eventualis is not sufficient and cannot properly be 
distinguished from cases of culpable homicide. The arguments put forward in this dissertation 
have led to the conclusion that the test for dolus eventualis, in the context of murder, should 
be reformulated as follows: 
 
i) Did the accused possess foresight of a real, reasonable or substantial possibility 
of death ensuing from their proposed course of conduct? In other words, was 
death foreseen as probable? This creates a higher standard of proof than the 
current test, which is appropriate for the seriousness of the crime of murder.  
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ii) If death was not foreseen as probable, it needs to be asked whether the accused’s 
conduct offends the legal system? In other words, did the accused’s conduct 
have any social utility and would the risk of death have existed but for the 
accused’s conduct? This covers those situations in which the risk taking of the 
accused demonstrates an ‘extreme indifference to the value of human life’ and, 
as such, cannot be regarded as merely negligent due to the moral 
blameworthiness of the accused.  
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